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Pension and state funds dominating biomedical R&D investment: fiduciary duty and public health
BACKGROUND: Who benefits from the commercial biomedical research and development (R&D)? Patients-consumers and investors-shareholders have traditionally been viewed as two distinct groups with conflicting interests: shareholders seek maximum profits, patients - maximum clinical benefit. However,...
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
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BioMed Central
2019
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Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6833262/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/31690328 http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s12992-019-0490-x |
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author | Roller, Slavek |
author_facet | Roller, Slavek |
author_sort | Roller, Slavek |
collection | PubMed |
description | BACKGROUND: Who benefits from the commercial biomedical research and development (R&D)? Patients-consumers and investors-shareholders have traditionally been viewed as two distinct groups with conflicting interests: shareholders seek maximum profits, patients - maximum clinical benefit. However, what happens when patients are the shareholders? With billions of dollars of public risk capital channeled into the drug development industry, analysing the complex financial architecture and the market for corporate control is essential for understanding industry’s characteristics, such as pricing strategies or R&D priorities. RESULTS: Adding investments by governmentally-mandated retirement schemes, central and promotional banks, and sovereign wealth funds to tax-derived governmental financing shows that the majority of biomedical R&D funding is public in origin. Despite this, even in the high-income countries patients can be denied access to effective treatments due to their high cost. Since these costs are set by the drug development firms that are owned in substantial part by the retirement accounts of said patients, the complex financial architecture of biomedical R&D may be inconsistent with the objectives of the ultimate beneficiaries. CONCLUSIONS: The divergence in economic and public health performance of the drug development industry is resultant from its financial underwriting by enormously expanded pension schemes, governmentally mandated to represent the interests of “captive” beneficiaries, as well as similar policymaker-designed funding flows, whose standards of transparency, accountability and representation are substantially lower than that of governments themselves. Strengthening those elements of institutional design and thus ensuring active responsible shareholding in the interest of the patients-savers is an under-utilised, but potentially high-impact opportunity for advancing public health. ELECTRONIC SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL: The online version of this article (10.1186/s12992-019-0490-x) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-6833262 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2019 |
publisher | BioMed Central |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-68332622019-11-08 Pension and state funds dominating biomedical R&D investment: fiduciary duty and public health Roller, Slavek Global Health Research BACKGROUND: Who benefits from the commercial biomedical research and development (R&D)? Patients-consumers and investors-shareholders have traditionally been viewed as two distinct groups with conflicting interests: shareholders seek maximum profits, patients - maximum clinical benefit. However, what happens when patients are the shareholders? With billions of dollars of public risk capital channeled into the drug development industry, analysing the complex financial architecture and the market for corporate control is essential for understanding industry’s characteristics, such as pricing strategies or R&D priorities. RESULTS: Adding investments by governmentally-mandated retirement schemes, central and promotional banks, and sovereign wealth funds to tax-derived governmental financing shows that the majority of biomedical R&D funding is public in origin. Despite this, even in the high-income countries patients can be denied access to effective treatments due to their high cost. Since these costs are set by the drug development firms that are owned in substantial part by the retirement accounts of said patients, the complex financial architecture of biomedical R&D may be inconsistent with the objectives of the ultimate beneficiaries. CONCLUSIONS: The divergence in economic and public health performance of the drug development industry is resultant from its financial underwriting by enormously expanded pension schemes, governmentally mandated to represent the interests of “captive” beneficiaries, as well as similar policymaker-designed funding flows, whose standards of transparency, accountability and representation are substantially lower than that of governments themselves. Strengthening those elements of institutional design and thus ensuring active responsible shareholding in the interest of the patients-savers is an under-utilised, but potentially high-impact opportunity for advancing public health. ELECTRONIC SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL: The online version of this article (10.1186/s12992-019-0490-x) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. BioMed Central 2019-11-06 /pmc/articles/PMC6833262/ /pubmed/31690328 http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s12992-019-0490-x Text en © The Author(s). 2019 Open AccessThis article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver (http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated. |
spellingShingle | Research Roller, Slavek Pension and state funds dominating biomedical R&D investment: fiduciary duty and public health |
title | Pension and state funds dominating biomedical R&D investment: fiduciary duty and public health |
title_full | Pension and state funds dominating biomedical R&D investment: fiduciary duty and public health |
title_fullStr | Pension and state funds dominating biomedical R&D investment: fiduciary duty and public health |
title_full_unstemmed | Pension and state funds dominating biomedical R&D investment: fiduciary duty and public health |
title_short | Pension and state funds dominating biomedical R&D investment: fiduciary duty and public health |
title_sort | pension and state funds dominating biomedical r&d investment: fiduciary duty and public health |
topic | Research |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6833262/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/31690328 http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s12992-019-0490-x |
work_keys_str_mv | AT rollerslavek pensionandstatefundsdominatingbiomedicalrdinvestmentfiduciarydutyandpublichealth |