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The neural representation of mental beliefs held by two agents

Neuroimaging research has demonstrated that mentalizing about false beliefs held by other people recruits the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). However, earlier work was limited to a single agent that held a false belief. We investigated the effect of two agents that held similar or mixed false and/o...

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Autores principales: Özdem, Ceylan, Brass, Marcel, Schippers, Arjen, Van der Cruyssen, Laurens, Van Overwalle, Frank
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Springer US 2019
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6861364/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30980338
http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13415-019-00714-2
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author Özdem, Ceylan
Brass, Marcel
Schippers, Arjen
Van der Cruyssen, Laurens
Van Overwalle, Frank
author_facet Özdem, Ceylan
Brass, Marcel
Schippers, Arjen
Van der Cruyssen, Laurens
Van Overwalle, Frank
author_sort Özdem, Ceylan
collection PubMed
description Neuroimaging research has demonstrated that mentalizing about false beliefs held by other people recruits the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). However, earlier work was limited to a single agent that held a false belief. We investigated the effect of two agents that held similar or mixed false and/or true beliefs. Participants saw animated stories with two smurfs holding true or false beliefs (Story phase). At the end of each trial, they were requested to take the perspective of the self or one of the smurfs (Question phase). We predicted that an increasing number of smurfs holding a false belief would increase activation in the TPJ when participants have to report the belief of the smurf, because the incongruent belief should have a stronger influence if it is held by two compared with one agent. This prediction was confirmed as activation in the TPJ during the Story and Question phase increased when more smurfs held a false belief. Taking the perspective of the self led to stronger activation of the TPJ in the two conditions that involved a true belief and weakest activation in the condition of two false beliefs. These data suggest that activation in TPJ depends on the perspective participants take, and that the number of agents holding a false belief influences activation in the TPJ only when taking the agent’s perspective. ELECTRONIC SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL: The online version of this article (10.3758/s13415-019-00714-2) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
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spelling pubmed-68613642019-12-03 The neural representation of mental beliefs held by two agents Özdem, Ceylan Brass, Marcel Schippers, Arjen Van der Cruyssen, Laurens Van Overwalle, Frank Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci Research Article Neuroimaging research has demonstrated that mentalizing about false beliefs held by other people recruits the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). However, earlier work was limited to a single agent that held a false belief. We investigated the effect of two agents that held similar or mixed false and/or true beliefs. Participants saw animated stories with two smurfs holding true or false beliefs (Story phase). At the end of each trial, they were requested to take the perspective of the self or one of the smurfs (Question phase). We predicted that an increasing number of smurfs holding a false belief would increase activation in the TPJ when participants have to report the belief of the smurf, because the incongruent belief should have a stronger influence if it is held by two compared with one agent. This prediction was confirmed as activation in the TPJ during the Story and Question phase increased when more smurfs held a false belief. Taking the perspective of the self led to stronger activation of the TPJ in the two conditions that involved a true belief and weakest activation in the condition of two false beliefs. These data suggest that activation in TPJ depends on the perspective participants take, and that the number of agents holding a false belief influences activation in the TPJ only when taking the agent’s perspective. ELECTRONIC SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL: The online version of this article (10.3758/s13415-019-00714-2) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. Springer US 2019-04-12 2019 /pmc/articles/PMC6861364/ /pubmed/30980338 http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13415-019-00714-2 Text en © The Author(s) 2019 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
spellingShingle Research Article
Özdem, Ceylan
Brass, Marcel
Schippers, Arjen
Van der Cruyssen, Laurens
Van Overwalle, Frank
The neural representation of mental beliefs held by two agents
title The neural representation of mental beliefs held by two agents
title_full The neural representation of mental beliefs held by two agents
title_fullStr The neural representation of mental beliefs held by two agents
title_full_unstemmed The neural representation of mental beliefs held by two agents
title_short The neural representation of mental beliefs held by two agents
title_sort neural representation of mental beliefs held by two agents
topic Research Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6861364/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30980338
http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13415-019-00714-2
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