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The neural representation of mental beliefs held by two agents
Neuroimaging research has demonstrated that mentalizing about false beliefs held by other people recruits the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). However, earlier work was limited to a single agent that held a false belief. We investigated the effect of two agents that held similar or mixed false and/o...
Autores principales: | , , , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Springer US
2019
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6861364/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30980338 http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13415-019-00714-2 |
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author | Özdem, Ceylan Brass, Marcel Schippers, Arjen Van der Cruyssen, Laurens Van Overwalle, Frank |
author_facet | Özdem, Ceylan Brass, Marcel Schippers, Arjen Van der Cruyssen, Laurens Van Overwalle, Frank |
author_sort | Özdem, Ceylan |
collection | PubMed |
description | Neuroimaging research has demonstrated that mentalizing about false beliefs held by other people recruits the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). However, earlier work was limited to a single agent that held a false belief. We investigated the effect of two agents that held similar or mixed false and/or true beliefs. Participants saw animated stories with two smurfs holding true or false beliefs (Story phase). At the end of each trial, they were requested to take the perspective of the self or one of the smurfs (Question phase). We predicted that an increasing number of smurfs holding a false belief would increase activation in the TPJ when participants have to report the belief of the smurf, because the incongruent belief should have a stronger influence if it is held by two compared with one agent. This prediction was confirmed as activation in the TPJ during the Story and Question phase increased when more smurfs held a false belief. Taking the perspective of the self led to stronger activation of the TPJ in the two conditions that involved a true belief and weakest activation in the condition of two false beliefs. These data suggest that activation in TPJ depends on the perspective participants take, and that the number of agents holding a false belief influences activation in the TPJ only when taking the agent’s perspective. ELECTRONIC SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL: The online version of this article (10.3758/s13415-019-00714-2) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-6861364 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2019 |
publisher | Springer US |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-68613642019-12-03 The neural representation of mental beliefs held by two agents Özdem, Ceylan Brass, Marcel Schippers, Arjen Van der Cruyssen, Laurens Van Overwalle, Frank Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci Research Article Neuroimaging research has demonstrated that mentalizing about false beliefs held by other people recruits the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). However, earlier work was limited to a single agent that held a false belief. We investigated the effect of two agents that held similar or mixed false and/or true beliefs. Participants saw animated stories with two smurfs holding true or false beliefs (Story phase). At the end of each trial, they were requested to take the perspective of the self or one of the smurfs (Question phase). We predicted that an increasing number of smurfs holding a false belief would increase activation in the TPJ when participants have to report the belief of the smurf, because the incongruent belief should have a stronger influence if it is held by two compared with one agent. This prediction was confirmed as activation in the TPJ during the Story and Question phase increased when more smurfs held a false belief. Taking the perspective of the self led to stronger activation of the TPJ in the two conditions that involved a true belief and weakest activation in the condition of two false beliefs. These data suggest that activation in TPJ depends on the perspective participants take, and that the number of agents holding a false belief influences activation in the TPJ only when taking the agent’s perspective. ELECTRONIC SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL: The online version of this article (10.3758/s13415-019-00714-2) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. Springer US 2019-04-12 2019 /pmc/articles/PMC6861364/ /pubmed/30980338 http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13415-019-00714-2 Text en © The Author(s) 2019 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. |
spellingShingle | Research Article Özdem, Ceylan Brass, Marcel Schippers, Arjen Van der Cruyssen, Laurens Van Overwalle, Frank The neural representation of mental beliefs held by two agents |
title | The neural representation of mental beliefs held by two agents |
title_full | The neural representation of mental beliefs held by two agents |
title_fullStr | The neural representation of mental beliefs held by two agents |
title_full_unstemmed | The neural representation of mental beliefs held by two agents |
title_short | The neural representation of mental beliefs held by two agents |
title_sort | neural representation of mental beliefs held by two agents |
topic | Research Article |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6861364/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30980338 http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13415-019-00714-2 |
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