Cargando…

Evaluation and improvement the safety of total marrow irradiation with helical tomotherapy using repeat failure mode and effects analysis

BACKGROUND & PURPOSE: Helical tomotherapy has been applied to total marrow irradiation (HT-TMI). Our objective was to apply failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) two times separated by 1 year to evaluate and improve the safety of HT-TMI. MATERIALS AND METHODS: A multidisciplinary team was cre...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Shen, Jiuling, Wang, Xiaoyong, Deng, Di, Gong, Jian, Tan, Kang, Zhao, Hongli, Bao, Zhirong, Xiao, Jinping, Liu, An, Zhou, Yunfeng, Liu, Hui, Xie, Conghua
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: BioMed Central 2019
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6935229/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/31882010
http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s13014-019-1433-7
Descripción
Sumario:BACKGROUND & PURPOSE: Helical tomotherapy has been applied to total marrow irradiation (HT-TMI). Our objective was to apply failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) two times separated by 1 year to evaluate and improve the safety of HT-TMI. MATERIALS AND METHODS: A multidisciplinary team was created. FMEA consists of 4 main steps: (1) Creation of a process map; (2) Identification of all potential failure mode (FM) in the process; (3) Evaluation of the occurrence (O), detectability (D) and severity of impact (S) of each FM according to a scoring criteria (1–10), with the subsequent calculation of the risk priority number (RPN=O*D*S) and (4) Identification of the feasible and effective quality control (QC) methods for the highest risks. A second FMEA was performed for the high-risk FMs based on the same risk analysis team in 1 year later. RESULTS: A total of 39 subprocesses and 122 FMs were derived. First time RPN ranged from 3 to 264.3. Twenty-five FMs were defined as being high-risk, with the top 5 FMs (first RPN/ second RPN): (1) treatment couch movement failure (264.3/102.8); (2) section plan dose junction error in delivery (236.7/110.4); (3) setup check by megavoltage computed tomography (MVCT) failure (216.8/94.6); (4) patient immobilization error (212.5/90.2) and (5) treatment interruption (204.8/134.2). A total of 20 staff members participated in the study. The second RPN value of the top 5 high-risk FMs were all decreased. CONCLUSION: QC interventions were implemented based on the FMEA results. HT-TMI specific treatment couch tests; the arms immobilization methods and strategy of section plan dose junction in delivery were proved to be effective in the improvement of the safety.