Bonus versus penalty: How robust are the effects of contract framing?

We study the relative effectiveness of contracts that are framed either in terms of bonuses or penalties. In one set of treatments, subjects know at the time of effort provision whether they have achieved the bonus/avoided the penalty. In another set of treatments, subjects only learn the success of...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: de Quidt, Jonathan, Fallucchi, Francesco, Kölle, Felix, Nosenzo, Daniele, Quercia, Simone
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Springer US 2017
Materias:
Original Paper
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6956932/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/31998603
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40881-017-0039-9
_version_ 1783487229851598848
author de Quidt, Jonathan
Fallucchi, Francesco
Kölle, Felix
Nosenzo, Daniele
Quercia, Simone
author_facet de Quidt, Jonathan
Fallucchi, Francesco
Kölle, Felix
Nosenzo, Daniele
Quercia, Simone
author_sort de Quidt, Jonathan
collection PubMed
description We study the relative effectiveness of contracts that are framed either in terms of bonuses or penalties. In one set of treatments, subjects know at the time of effort provision whether they have achieved the bonus/avoided the penalty. In another set of treatments, subjects only learn the success of their performance at the end of the task. We fail to observe a contract framing effect in either condition: effort provision is statistically indistinguishable under bonus and penalty contracts. ELECTRONIC SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL: The online version of this article (doi:10.1007/s40881-017-0039-9) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
format Online
Article
Text
id pubmed-6956932
institution National Center for Biotechnology Information
language English
publishDate 2017
publisher Springer US
record_format MEDLINE/PubMed
spelling pubmed-69569322020-01-27 Bonus versus penalty: How robust are the effects of contract framing? de Quidt, Jonathan Fallucchi, Francesco Kölle, Felix Nosenzo, Daniele Quercia, Simone J Econ Sci Assoc Original Paper We study the relative effectiveness of contracts that are framed either in terms of bonuses or penalties. In one set of treatments, subjects know at the time of effort provision whether they have achieved the bonus/avoided the penalty. In another set of treatments, subjects only learn the success of their performance at the end of the task. We fail to observe a contract framing effect in either condition: effort provision is statistically indistinguishable under bonus and penalty contracts. ELECTRONIC SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL: The online version of this article (doi:10.1007/s40881-017-0039-9) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. Springer US 2017-09-23 2017 /pmc/articles/PMC6956932/ /pubmed/31998603 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40881-017-0039-9 Text en © The Author(s) 2017 Open AccessThis article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
spellingShingle Original Paper
de Quidt, Jonathan
Fallucchi, Francesco
Kölle, Felix
Nosenzo, Daniele
Quercia, Simone
Bonus versus penalty: How robust are the effects of contract framing?
title Bonus versus penalty: How robust are the effects of contract framing?
title_full Bonus versus penalty: How robust are the effects of contract framing?
title_fullStr Bonus versus penalty: How robust are the effects of contract framing?
title_full_unstemmed Bonus versus penalty: How robust are the effects of contract framing?
title_short Bonus versus penalty: How robust are the effects of contract framing?
title_sort bonus versus penalty: how robust are the effects of contract framing?
topic Original Paper
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6956932/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/31998603
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40881-017-0039-9
work_keys_str_mv AT dequidtjonathan bonusversuspenaltyhowrobustaretheeffectsofcontractframing
AT fallucchifrancesco bonusversuspenaltyhowrobustaretheeffectsofcontractframing
AT kollefelix bonusversuspenaltyhowrobustaretheeffectsofcontractframing
AT nosenzodaniele bonusversuspenaltyhowrobustaretheeffectsofcontractframing
AT querciasimone bonusversuspenaltyhowrobustaretheeffectsofcontractframing

Ejemplares similares