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If Veganism Is Not a Choice: The Moral Psychology of Possibilities in Animal Ethics

SIMPLE SUMMARY: Discussions about the ethics of buying and consuming animal products normally assume that there are two choices equally available to moral agents: to engage or not to engage in such behaviour. This paper suggests that, in some cases, the experience of those who refuse to participate...

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Autor principal: Panizza, Silvia
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: MDPI 2020
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7023007/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/31963152
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ani10010145
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author Panizza, Silvia
author_facet Panizza, Silvia
author_sort Panizza, Silvia
collection PubMed
description SIMPLE SUMMARY: Discussions about the ethics of buying and consuming animal products normally assume that there are two choices equally available to moral agents: to engage or not to engage in such behaviour. This paper suggests that, in some cases, the experience of those who refuse to participate in animal exploitation is not a choice, but a reconfiguration of their understanding of what animals, and the products made out of them, are. Such reconfiguration involves not seeing animals as something to eat, wear, control, etc. Hence, it is not always correct to speak of veganism as a choice: the reason being that, sometimes, the opposite does not present itself as a possibility. ABSTRACT: In their daily practices, many ethical vegans choose what to eat, wear, and buy among a range that is limited to the exclusion of animal products. Rather than considering and then rejecting the idea of using such products, doing so often does not occur to them as a possibility at all. In other cases, when confronted with the possibility of consuming animal products, vegans have claimed to reject it by saying that it would be impossible for them to do so. I refer to this phenomenon as ‘moral impossibility’. An analysis of moral impossibility in animal ethics shows that it arises when one’s conception of ‘what animals are’ shifts—say through encounter with other animals. It also arises when individuals learn more about animals and what happens to them in production facilities. This establishes a link between increased knowledge, understanding, and imaginative exploration on the one hand, and the exclusion of the possibility of using animals as resources on the other. Taking moral impossibility in veganism seriously has two important consequences: one is that the debate around veganism needs to shift from choice and decision, to a prior analysis of concepts and moral framing; the other is that moral psychology is no longer seen as empirical psychology plus ethical analysis, but the contents of psychological findings are understood as being influenced and framed by moral reflection.
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spelling pubmed-70230072020-03-12 If Veganism Is Not a Choice: The Moral Psychology of Possibilities in Animal Ethics Panizza, Silvia Animals (Basel) Article SIMPLE SUMMARY: Discussions about the ethics of buying and consuming animal products normally assume that there are two choices equally available to moral agents: to engage or not to engage in such behaviour. This paper suggests that, in some cases, the experience of those who refuse to participate in animal exploitation is not a choice, but a reconfiguration of their understanding of what animals, and the products made out of them, are. Such reconfiguration involves not seeing animals as something to eat, wear, control, etc. Hence, it is not always correct to speak of veganism as a choice: the reason being that, sometimes, the opposite does not present itself as a possibility. ABSTRACT: In their daily practices, many ethical vegans choose what to eat, wear, and buy among a range that is limited to the exclusion of animal products. Rather than considering and then rejecting the idea of using such products, doing so often does not occur to them as a possibility at all. In other cases, when confronted with the possibility of consuming animal products, vegans have claimed to reject it by saying that it would be impossible for them to do so. I refer to this phenomenon as ‘moral impossibility’. An analysis of moral impossibility in animal ethics shows that it arises when one’s conception of ‘what animals are’ shifts—say through encounter with other animals. It also arises when individuals learn more about animals and what happens to them in production facilities. This establishes a link between increased knowledge, understanding, and imaginative exploration on the one hand, and the exclusion of the possibility of using animals as resources on the other. Taking moral impossibility in veganism seriously has two important consequences: one is that the debate around veganism needs to shift from choice and decision, to a prior analysis of concepts and moral framing; the other is that moral psychology is no longer seen as empirical psychology plus ethical analysis, but the contents of psychological findings are understood as being influenced and framed by moral reflection. MDPI 2020-01-16 /pmc/articles/PMC7023007/ /pubmed/31963152 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ani10010145 Text en © 2020 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
spellingShingle Article
Panizza, Silvia
If Veganism Is Not a Choice: The Moral Psychology of Possibilities in Animal Ethics
title If Veganism Is Not a Choice: The Moral Psychology of Possibilities in Animal Ethics
title_full If Veganism Is Not a Choice: The Moral Psychology of Possibilities in Animal Ethics
title_fullStr If Veganism Is Not a Choice: The Moral Psychology of Possibilities in Animal Ethics
title_full_unstemmed If Veganism Is Not a Choice: The Moral Psychology of Possibilities in Animal Ethics
title_short If Veganism Is Not a Choice: The Moral Psychology of Possibilities in Animal Ethics
title_sort if veganism is not a choice: the moral psychology of possibilities in animal ethics
topic Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7023007/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/31963152
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ani10010145
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