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Stable Matching with Uncertain Linear Preferences

We consider the two-sided stable matching setting in which there may be uncertainty about the agents’ preferences due to limited information or communication. We consider three models of uncertainty: (1) lottery model—for each agent, there is a probability distribution over linear preferences, (2) c...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Aziz, Haris, Biró, Péter, Gaspers, Serge, de Haan, Ronald, Mattei, Nicholas, Rastegari, Baharak
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Springer US 2019
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7066306/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32214575
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00453-019-00650-0

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