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An Evolutionary Game Model for the Multi-Agent Co-Governance of Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution Control under Intensive Management Pattern in China

This paper focuses on the sustainable development dilemma of agricultural production in China under the pattern of intensive management, which is seriously challenged by agricultural non-point source pollution. The key to effectively break through the dilemma is to promote the co-governance of agric...

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Autores principales: Xu, Lingyan, Zhou, Zhuoyun, Du, Jianguo
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: MDPI 2020
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7177998/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32260432
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17072472
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author Xu, Lingyan
Zhou, Zhuoyun
Du, Jianguo
author_facet Xu, Lingyan
Zhou, Zhuoyun
Du, Jianguo
author_sort Xu, Lingyan
collection PubMed
description This paper focuses on the sustainable development dilemma of agricultural production in China under the pattern of intensive management, which is seriously challenged by agricultural non-point source pollution. The key to effectively break through the dilemma is to promote the co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control by stakeholders including local governments, new agricultural operators and traditional farmers. Accordingly, this paper discusses the interactive decision-making relationships between new agricultural operators and traditional farmers under the guidance of local governments, by constructing a trilateral evolutionary game model, as well as analyzing evolutionary cooperative stability strategies and realizing the simulation of evolution processes in different scenarios by MATLAB. The results show that new agricultural operators play a leading role in agricultural non-point source pollution control, whose strategies have effects such as technology spillover. The rewards from the superior government will support local governments in taking proactive action in the co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control, and then local governments can offer technical support and subsidies to new agricultural operators and traditional farmers for reducing their costs. Furthermore, this paper also finds that there are green synergy effects among the groups, where the variations of parameters and strategies by one group would affect the two others. Additionally, agricultural land operation rights transfers would cause traditional farmers to take more time to cooperate in the co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control. In order to promote the multi-agent co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control under intensive management pattern, this paper suggests that it should be necessary to reduce their costs and improve incentives, as well as to increase the common interests among groups and enhance their green synergy effects.
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spelling pubmed-71779982020-04-28 An Evolutionary Game Model for the Multi-Agent Co-Governance of Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution Control under Intensive Management Pattern in China Xu, Lingyan Zhou, Zhuoyun Du, Jianguo Int J Environ Res Public Health Article This paper focuses on the sustainable development dilemma of agricultural production in China under the pattern of intensive management, which is seriously challenged by agricultural non-point source pollution. The key to effectively break through the dilemma is to promote the co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control by stakeholders including local governments, new agricultural operators and traditional farmers. Accordingly, this paper discusses the interactive decision-making relationships between new agricultural operators and traditional farmers under the guidance of local governments, by constructing a trilateral evolutionary game model, as well as analyzing evolutionary cooperative stability strategies and realizing the simulation of evolution processes in different scenarios by MATLAB. The results show that new agricultural operators play a leading role in agricultural non-point source pollution control, whose strategies have effects such as technology spillover. The rewards from the superior government will support local governments in taking proactive action in the co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control, and then local governments can offer technical support and subsidies to new agricultural operators and traditional farmers for reducing their costs. Furthermore, this paper also finds that there are green synergy effects among the groups, where the variations of parameters and strategies by one group would affect the two others. Additionally, agricultural land operation rights transfers would cause traditional farmers to take more time to cooperate in the co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control. In order to promote the multi-agent co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control under intensive management pattern, this paper suggests that it should be necessary to reduce their costs and improve incentives, as well as to increase the common interests among groups and enhance their green synergy effects. MDPI 2020-04-04 2020-04 /pmc/articles/PMC7177998/ /pubmed/32260432 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17072472 Text en © 2020 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
spellingShingle Article
Xu, Lingyan
Zhou, Zhuoyun
Du, Jianguo
An Evolutionary Game Model for the Multi-Agent Co-Governance of Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution Control under Intensive Management Pattern in China
title An Evolutionary Game Model for the Multi-Agent Co-Governance of Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution Control under Intensive Management Pattern in China
title_full An Evolutionary Game Model for the Multi-Agent Co-Governance of Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution Control under Intensive Management Pattern in China
title_fullStr An Evolutionary Game Model for the Multi-Agent Co-Governance of Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution Control under Intensive Management Pattern in China
title_full_unstemmed An Evolutionary Game Model for the Multi-Agent Co-Governance of Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution Control under Intensive Management Pattern in China
title_short An Evolutionary Game Model for the Multi-Agent Co-Governance of Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution Control under Intensive Management Pattern in China
title_sort evolutionary game model for the multi-agent co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control under intensive management pattern in china
topic Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7177998/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32260432
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17072472
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