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An Evolutionary Game Model for the Multi-Agent Co-Governance of Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution Control under Intensive Management Pattern in China
This paper focuses on the sustainable development dilemma of agricultural production in China under the pattern of intensive management, which is seriously challenged by agricultural non-point source pollution. The key to effectively break through the dilemma is to promote the co-governance of agric...
Autores principales: | Xu, Lingyan, Zhou, Zhuoyun, Du, Jianguo |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
MDPI
2020
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7177998/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32260432 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17072472 |
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