Cargando…
A political economy perspective on horizontal FDI in a dynamic Cournot-oligopoly with endogenous entry()
Entry in a homogeneous Cournot-oligopoly is excessive if and only if there is business-stealing (Amir et al., 2014). The excessive entry prediction has been derived primarily for closed economies and using a welfarist benchmark. We extend this framework and allow for (1) horizontal FDI in a multi-pe...
Autor principal: | Goerke, Laszlo |
---|---|
Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Elsevier B.V.
2020
|
Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7194081/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32362700 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101897 |
Ejemplares similares
-
Differentiated Entry or “Me-Too” Entry in Bertrand and Cournot Oligopoly
por: Brander, James A., et al.
Publicado: (2021) -
Dynamic Models of Oligopoly
por: Fudenberg, D
Publicado: (2013) -
Dynamic oligopolies with time delays
por: Matsumoto, Akio, et al.
Publicado: (2018) -
Patent Licensing and Capacity in a Cournot Model
por: Colombo, Stefano, et al.
Publicado: (2022) -
Endogenous R&D spillover and location choice in a mixed oligopoly
por: Zhang, Jianhu, et al.
Publicado: (2013)