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The United Kingdom’s Coronavirus Act, deprivations of liberty, and the right to liberty and security of the person

In response to the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus pandemic the UK government has passed the Coronavirus Act 2020 (CA). Among other things, this act extends existing statutory powers to impose restrictions of liberty for public health purposes. The extension of such powers naturally raises concerns about whe...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Pugh, Jonathan
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Oxford University Press 2020
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7197562/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32728458
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsaa011
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author Pugh, Jonathan
author_facet Pugh, Jonathan
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description In response to the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus pandemic the UK government has passed the Coronavirus Act 2020 (CA). Among other things, this act extends existing statutory powers to impose restrictions of liberty for public health purposes. The extension of such powers naturally raises concerns about whether their use will be compatible with human rights law. In particular, it is unclear whether their use will fall within the public heath exception to the Article 5 right to liberty and security of the person in the European Convention of Human Rights. In this paper, I outline key features of the CA, and briefly consider how the European Court of Human Rights has interpreted the public health exception to Article 5 rights. This analysis suggests two grounds on which restrictions of liberty enforced some under the CA might be vulnerable to claims of Article 5 rights violations. First, the absence of specified time limits on certain restrictions of liberty means that they may fail the requirement of legal certainty championed by the European Court in its interpretation of the public health exception. Second, the Coronavirus Act’s extension of powers to individuals lacking public health expertise may undermine the extent to which the act will ensure that deprivations of liberty are necessary and proportionate.
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spelling pubmed-71975622020-05-05 The United Kingdom’s Coronavirus Act, deprivations of liberty, and the right to liberty and security of the person Pugh, Jonathan J Law Biosci Original Article In response to the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus pandemic the UK government has passed the Coronavirus Act 2020 (CA). Among other things, this act extends existing statutory powers to impose restrictions of liberty for public health purposes. The extension of such powers naturally raises concerns about whether their use will be compatible with human rights law. In particular, it is unclear whether their use will fall within the public heath exception to the Article 5 right to liberty and security of the person in the European Convention of Human Rights. In this paper, I outline key features of the CA, and briefly consider how the European Court of Human Rights has interpreted the public health exception to Article 5 rights. This analysis suggests two grounds on which restrictions of liberty enforced some under the CA might be vulnerable to claims of Article 5 rights violations. First, the absence of specified time limits on certain restrictions of liberty means that they may fail the requirement of legal certainty championed by the European Court in its interpretation of the public health exception. Second, the Coronavirus Act’s extension of powers to individuals lacking public health expertise may undermine the extent to which the act will ensure that deprivations of liberty are necessary and proportionate. Oxford University Press 2020-04-29 /pmc/articles/PMC7197562/ /pubmed/32728458 http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsaa011 Text en © The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Duke University School of Law, Harvard Law School, Oxford University Press, and Stanford Law School. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) ), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact journals.permissions@oup.com
spellingShingle Original Article
Pugh, Jonathan
The United Kingdom’s Coronavirus Act, deprivations of liberty, and the right to liberty and security of the person
title The United Kingdom’s Coronavirus Act, deprivations of liberty, and the right to liberty and security of the person
title_full The United Kingdom’s Coronavirus Act, deprivations of liberty, and the right to liberty and security of the person
title_fullStr The United Kingdom’s Coronavirus Act, deprivations of liberty, and the right to liberty and security of the person
title_full_unstemmed The United Kingdom’s Coronavirus Act, deprivations of liberty, and the right to liberty and security of the person
title_short The United Kingdom’s Coronavirus Act, deprivations of liberty, and the right to liberty and security of the person
title_sort united kingdom’s coronavirus act, deprivations of liberty, and the right to liberty and security of the person
topic Original Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7197562/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32728458
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsaa011
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