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Re-imaging the intentional stance

The commonly used paradigm to investigate Dennet's ‘intentional stance’ compares neural activation when participants compete with a human versus a computer. This paradigm confounds whether the opponent is natural or artificial and whether it is intentional or an automaton. This functional magne...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Abu-Akel, Ahmad M., Apperly, Ian A., Wood, Stephen J., Hansen, Peter C.
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: The Royal Society 2020
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7211435/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32290800
http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2020.0244
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author Abu-Akel, Ahmad M.
Apperly, Ian A.
Wood, Stephen J.
Hansen, Peter C.
author_facet Abu-Akel, Ahmad M.
Apperly, Ian A.
Wood, Stephen J.
Hansen, Peter C.
author_sort Abu-Akel, Ahmad M.
collection PubMed
description The commonly used paradigm to investigate Dennet's ‘intentional stance’ compares neural activation when participants compete with a human versus a computer. This paradigm confounds whether the opponent is natural or artificial and whether it is intentional or an automaton. This functional magnetic resonance imaging study is, to our knowledge, the first to investigate the intentional stance by orthogonally varying perceptions of the opponents' intentionality (responding actively or passively according to a script) and embodiment (human or a computer). The mere perception of the opponent (whether human or computer) as intentional activated the mentalizing network: the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) bilaterally, right temporal pole, anterior paracingulate cortex (aPCC) and the precuneus. Interacting with humans versus computers induced activations in a more circumscribed right lateralized subnetwork within the mentalizing network, consisting of the TPJ and the aPCC, possibly reflective of the tendency to spontaneously attribute intentionality to humans. The interaction between intentionality (active versus passive) and opponent (human versus computer) recruited the left frontal pole, possibly in response to violations of the default intentional stance towards humans and computers. Employing an orthogonal design is important to adequately capture Dennett's conception of the intentional stance as a mentalizing strategy that can apply equally well to humans and other intentional agents.
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spelling pubmed-72114352020-05-12 Re-imaging the intentional stance Abu-Akel, Ahmad M. Apperly, Ian A. Wood, Stephen J. Hansen, Peter C. Proc Biol Sci Neuroscience and Cognition The commonly used paradigm to investigate Dennet's ‘intentional stance’ compares neural activation when participants compete with a human versus a computer. This paradigm confounds whether the opponent is natural or artificial and whether it is intentional or an automaton. This functional magnetic resonance imaging study is, to our knowledge, the first to investigate the intentional stance by orthogonally varying perceptions of the opponents' intentionality (responding actively or passively according to a script) and embodiment (human or a computer). The mere perception of the opponent (whether human or computer) as intentional activated the mentalizing network: the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) bilaterally, right temporal pole, anterior paracingulate cortex (aPCC) and the precuneus. Interacting with humans versus computers induced activations in a more circumscribed right lateralized subnetwork within the mentalizing network, consisting of the TPJ and the aPCC, possibly reflective of the tendency to spontaneously attribute intentionality to humans. The interaction between intentionality (active versus passive) and opponent (human versus computer) recruited the left frontal pole, possibly in response to violations of the default intentional stance towards humans and computers. Employing an orthogonal design is important to adequately capture Dennett's conception of the intentional stance as a mentalizing strategy that can apply equally well to humans and other intentional agents. The Royal Society 2020-04-29 2020-04-15 /pmc/articles/PMC7211435/ /pubmed/32290800 http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2020.0244 Text en © 2020 The Authors. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted use, provided the original author and source are credited.
spellingShingle Neuroscience and Cognition
Abu-Akel, Ahmad M.
Apperly, Ian A.
Wood, Stephen J.
Hansen, Peter C.
Re-imaging the intentional stance
title Re-imaging the intentional stance
title_full Re-imaging the intentional stance
title_fullStr Re-imaging the intentional stance
title_full_unstemmed Re-imaging the intentional stance
title_short Re-imaging the intentional stance
title_sort re-imaging the intentional stance
topic Neuroscience and Cognition
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7211435/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32290800
http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2020.0244
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