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Causal Responsibility and Robust Causation
How do people judge the degree of causal responsibility that an agent has for the outcomes of her actions? We show that a relatively unexplored factor – the robustness (or stability) of the causal chain linking the agent’s action and the outcome – influences judgments of causal responsibility of the...
Autores principales: | , , , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Frontiers Media S.A.
2020
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7269104/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32536893 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01069 |
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author | Grinfeld, Guy Lagnado, David Gerstenberg, Tobias Woodward, James F. Usher, Marius |
author_facet | Grinfeld, Guy Lagnado, David Gerstenberg, Tobias Woodward, James F. Usher, Marius |
author_sort | Grinfeld, Guy |
collection | PubMed |
description | How do people judge the degree of causal responsibility that an agent has for the outcomes of her actions? We show that a relatively unexplored factor – the robustness (or stability) of the causal chain linking the agent’s action and the outcome – influences judgments of causal responsibility of the agent. In three experiments, we vary robustness by manipulating the number of background circumstances under which the action causes the effect, and find that causal responsibility judgments increase with robustness. In the first experiment, the robustness manipulation also raises the probability of the effect given the action. Experiments 2 and 3 control for probability-raising, and show that robustness still affects judgments of causal responsibility. In particular, Experiment 3 introduces an Ellsberg type of scenario to manipulate robustness, while keeping the conditional probability and the skill deployed in the action fixed. Experiment 4, replicates the results of Experiment 3, while contrasting between judgments of causal strength and of causal responsibility. The results show that in all cases, the perceived degree of responsibility (but not of causal strength) increases with the robustness of the action-outcome causal chain. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-7269104 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2020 |
publisher | Frontiers Media S.A. |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-72691042020-06-12 Causal Responsibility and Robust Causation Grinfeld, Guy Lagnado, David Gerstenberg, Tobias Woodward, James F. Usher, Marius Front Psychol Psychology How do people judge the degree of causal responsibility that an agent has for the outcomes of her actions? We show that a relatively unexplored factor – the robustness (or stability) of the causal chain linking the agent’s action and the outcome – influences judgments of causal responsibility of the agent. In three experiments, we vary robustness by manipulating the number of background circumstances under which the action causes the effect, and find that causal responsibility judgments increase with robustness. In the first experiment, the robustness manipulation also raises the probability of the effect given the action. Experiments 2 and 3 control for probability-raising, and show that robustness still affects judgments of causal responsibility. In particular, Experiment 3 introduces an Ellsberg type of scenario to manipulate robustness, while keeping the conditional probability and the skill deployed in the action fixed. Experiment 4, replicates the results of Experiment 3, while contrasting between judgments of causal strength and of causal responsibility. The results show that in all cases, the perceived degree of responsibility (but not of causal strength) increases with the robustness of the action-outcome causal chain. Frontiers Media S.A. 2020-05-27 /pmc/articles/PMC7269104/ /pubmed/32536893 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01069 Text en Copyright © 2020 Grinfeld, Lagnado, Gerstenberg, Woodward and Usher. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms. |
spellingShingle | Psychology Grinfeld, Guy Lagnado, David Gerstenberg, Tobias Woodward, James F. Usher, Marius Causal Responsibility and Robust Causation |
title | Causal Responsibility and Robust Causation |
title_full | Causal Responsibility and Robust Causation |
title_fullStr | Causal Responsibility and Robust Causation |
title_full_unstemmed | Causal Responsibility and Robust Causation |
title_short | Causal Responsibility and Robust Causation |
title_sort | causal responsibility and robust causation |
topic | Psychology |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7269104/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32536893 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01069 |
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