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Evolution of conditional cooperation in public good games
Cooperation declines in repeated public good games because individuals behave as conditional cooperators. This is because individuals imitate the social behaviour of successful individuals when their payoff information is available. However, in human societies, individuals cooperate in many situatio...
| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
| Lenguaje: | English |
| Publicado: |
The Royal Society
2020
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| Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7277267/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32537191 http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.191567 |