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Industry incentives and antibiotic resistance: an introduction to the antibiotic susceptibility bonus
The scarcity of novel antibiotic compounds in a time of increasing resistance rates has begun to ring alarm bells at the highest echelons of government. Large new financial incentives to accelerate antibiotic research and development, such as market entry rewards (MERs), are being considered. Howeve...
Autores principales: | , , , , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Nature Publishing Group UK
2020
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7292800/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32203126 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41429-020-0300-y |
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author | Morel, Chantal M. Lindahl, Olof Harbarth, Stephan de Kraker, Marlieke E. A. Edwards, Suzanne Hollis, Aidan |
author_facet | Morel, Chantal M. Lindahl, Olof Harbarth, Stephan de Kraker, Marlieke E. A. Edwards, Suzanne Hollis, Aidan |
author_sort | Morel, Chantal M. |
collection | PubMed |
description | The scarcity of novel antibiotic compounds in a time of increasing resistance rates has begun to ring alarm bells at the highest echelons of government. Large new financial incentives to accelerate antibiotic research and development, such as market entry rewards (MERs), are being considered. However, there is little focus on how to sustain the efficacy of new, promising antibiotics reaching the market. Currently, inappropriate use of antibiotics is commonplace, which has accelerated resistance development. In an attempt to halt this trend, antibiotic stewardship policies are being implemented in many resource-rich settings. Unfortunately, this has not yet had an impact on the amount of antibiotics being prescribed globally. One important hurdle is misalignment of incentives. While governments and health services are incentivized to promote prudent use of this common good, pharmaceutical companies are incentivized to increase volume of sales to maximize profits. This problem must be addressed or else the major efforts going into developing new antibiotics will be in vain. In this paper we outline an approach to realign the incentives of pharmaceutical companies with wider antibiotic conservation efforts by making a staged bonus a component of an MER for antibiotic developers when resistance to their drug remains low over time. This bonus could address the lack of stewardship focus in any innovation-geared incentive. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-7292800 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2020 |
publisher | Nature Publishing Group UK |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-72928002020-06-15 Industry incentives and antibiotic resistance: an introduction to the antibiotic susceptibility bonus Morel, Chantal M. Lindahl, Olof Harbarth, Stephan de Kraker, Marlieke E. A. Edwards, Suzanne Hollis, Aidan J Antibiot (Tokyo) Review Article The scarcity of novel antibiotic compounds in a time of increasing resistance rates has begun to ring alarm bells at the highest echelons of government. Large new financial incentives to accelerate antibiotic research and development, such as market entry rewards (MERs), are being considered. However, there is little focus on how to sustain the efficacy of new, promising antibiotics reaching the market. Currently, inappropriate use of antibiotics is commonplace, which has accelerated resistance development. In an attempt to halt this trend, antibiotic stewardship policies are being implemented in many resource-rich settings. Unfortunately, this has not yet had an impact on the amount of antibiotics being prescribed globally. One important hurdle is misalignment of incentives. While governments and health services are incentivized to promote prudent use of this common good, pharmaceutical companies are incentivized to increase volume of sales to maximize profits. This problem must be addressed or else the major efforts going into developing new antibiotics will be in vain. In this paper we outline an approach to realign the incentives of pharmaceutical companies with wider antibiotic conservation efforts by making a staged bonus a component of an MER for antibiotic developers when resistance to their drug remains low over time. This bonus could address the lack of stewardship focus in any innovation-geared incentive. Nature Publishing Group UK 2020-03-19 2020 /pmc/articles/PMC7292800/ /pubmed/32203126 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41429-020-0300-y Text en © The Author(s) 2020 Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. |
spellingShingle | Review Article Morel, Chantal M. Lindahl, Olof Harbarth, Stephan de Kraker, Marlieke E. A. Edwards, Suzanne Hollis, Aidan Industry incentives and antibiotic resistance: an introduction to the antibiotic susceptibility bonus |
title | Industry incentives and antibiotic resistance: an introduction to the antibiotic susceptibility bonus |
title_full | Industry incentives and antibiotic resistance: an introduction to the antibiotic susceptibility bonus |
title_fullStr | Industry incentives and antibiotic resistance: an introduction to the antibiotic susceptibility bonus |
title_full_unstemmed | Industry incentives and antibiotic resistance: an introduction to the antibiotic susceptibility bonus |
title_short | Industry incentives and antibiotic resistance: an introduction to the antibiotic susceptibility bonus |
title_sort | industry incentives and antibiotic resistance: an introduction to the antibiotic susceptibility bonus |
topic | Review Article |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7292800/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32203126 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41429-020-0300-y |
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