COVID-19, insurer board utility, and capital regulation

This paper develops a down-and-out call option model by introducing a structural break in volatility to capture the coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak. The life insurer's equity and its board's utility are evaluated at the optimal guaranteed rate in the equity maximization. Results suggest th...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Li, Xuelian, Lin, Panpan, Lin, Jyh-Horng
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Elsevier Inc. 2020
Materias:
Article
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7299873/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32837371
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2020.101659
Descripción
Sumario:This paper develops a down-and-out call option model by introducing a structural break in volatility to capture the coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak. The life insurer's equity and its board's utility are evaluated at the optimal guaranteed rate in the equity maximization. Results suggest that the seriousness degree of the COVID-19 outbreak and capital regulation enhance the optimal guaranteed rate and the board's utility. Increased the board's utility by increasing liabilities costs insurer profitability. Conflicts of incentives can arise during the COVID-19 outbreak.

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