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Phenomenal Consciousness and Emergence: Eliminating the Explanatory Gap
The role of emergence in the creation of consciousness has been debated for over a century, but it remains unresolved. In particular there is controversy over the claim that a “strong” or radical form of emergence is required to explain phenomenal consciousness. In this paper we use some ideas of co...
Autores principales: | , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
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Frontiers Media S.A.
2020
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Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7304239/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32595555 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01041 |
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author | Feinberg, Todd E. Mallatt, Jon |
author_facet | Feinberg, Todd E. Mallatt, Jon |
author_sort | Feinberg, Todd E. |
collection | PubMed |
description | The role of emergence in the creation of consciousness has been debated for over a century, but it remains unresolved. In particular there is controversy over the claim that a “strong” or radical form of emergence is required to explain phenomenal consciousness. In this paper we use some ideas of complex system theory to trace the emergent features of life and then of complex brains through three progressive stages or levels: Level 1 (life), Level 2 (nervous systems), and Level 3 (special neurobiological features), each representing increasing biological and neurobiological complexity and ultimately leading to the emergence of phenomenal consciousness, all in physical systems. Along the way we show that consciousness fits the criteria of an emergent property—albeit one with extreme complexity. The formulation Life + Special neurobiological features → Phenomenal consciousness expresses these relationships. Then we consider the implications of our findings for some of the philosophical conundrums entailed by the apparent “explanatory gap” between the brain and phenomenal consciousness. We conclude that consciousness stems from the personal life of an organism with the addition of a complex nervous system that is ideally suited to maximize emergent neurobiological features and that it is an example of standard (“weak”) emergence without a scientific explanatory gap. An “experiential” or epistemic gap remains, although this is ontologically untroubling. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-7304239 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2020 |
publisher | Frontiers Media S.A. |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-73042392020-06-26 Phenomenal Consciousness and Emergence: Eliminating the Explanatory Gap Feinberg, Todd E. Mallatt, Jon Front Psychol Psychology The role of emergence in the creation of consciousness has been debated for over a century, but it remains unresolved. In particular there is controversy over the claim that a “strong” or radical form of emergence is required to explain phenomenal consciousness. In this paper we use some ideas of complex system theory to trace the emergent features of life and then of complex brains through three progressive stages or levels: Level 1 (life), Level 2 (nervous systems), and Level 3 (special neurobiological features), each representing increasing biological and neurobiological complexity and ultimately leading to the emergence of phenomenal consciousness, all in physical systems. Along the way we show that consciousness fits the criteria of an emergent property—albeit one with extreme complexity. The formulation Life + Special neurobiological features → Phenomenal consciousness expresses these relationships. Then we consider the implications of our findings for some of the philosophical conundrums entailed by the apparent “explanatory gap” between the brain and phenomenal consciousness. We conclude that consciousness stems from the personal life of an organism with the addition of a complex nervous system that is ideally suited to maximize emergent neurobiological features and that it is an example of standard (“weak”) emergence without a scientific explanatory gap. An “experiential” or epistemic gap remains, although this is ontologically untroubling. Frontiers Media S.A. 2020-06-12 /pmc/articles/PMC7304239/ /pubmed/32595555 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01041 Text en Copyright © 2020 Feinberg and Mallatt. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms. |
spellingShingle | Psychology Feinberg, Todd E. Mallatt, Jon Phenomenal Consciousness and Emergence: Eliminating the Explanatory Gap |
title | Phenomenal Consciousness and Emergence: Eliminating the Explanatory Gap |
title_full | Phenomenal Consciousness and Emergence: Eliminating the Explanatory Gap |
title_fullStr | Phenomenal Consciousness and Emergence: Eliminating the Explanatory Gap |
title_full_unstemmed | Phenomenal Consciousness and Emergence: Eliminating the Explanatory Gap |
title_short | Phenomenal Consciousness and Emergence: Eliminating the Explanatory Gap |
title_sort | phenomenal consciousness and emergence: eliminating the explanatory gap |
topic | Psychology |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7304239/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32595555 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01041 |
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