Cargando…

Phenomenal Consciousness and Emergence: Eliminating the Explanatory Gap

The role of emergence in the creation of consciousness has been debated for over a century, but it remains unresolved. In particular there is controversy over the claim that a “strong” or radical form of emergence is required to explain phenomenal consciousness. In this paper we use some ideas of co...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Feinberg, Todd E., Mallatt, Jon
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Frontiers Media S.A. 2020
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7304239/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32595555
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01041
_version_ 1783548226666758144
author Feinberg, Todd E.
Mallatt, Jon
author_facet Feinberg, Todd E.
Mallatt, Jon
author_sort Feinberg, Todd E.
collection PubMed
description The role of emergence in the creation of consciousness has been debated for over a century, but it remains unresolved. In particular there is controversy over the claim that a “strong” or radical form of emergence is required to explain phenomenal consciousness. In this paper we use some ideas of complex system theory to trace the emergent features of life and then of complex brains through three progressive stages or levels: Level 1 (life), Level 2 (nervous systems), and Level 3 (special neurobiological features), each representing increasing biological and neurobiological complexity and ultimately leading to the emergence of phenomenal consciousness, all in physical systems. Along the way we show that consciousness fits the criteria of an emergent property—albeit one with extreme complexity. The formulation Life + Special neurobiological features → Phenomenal consciousness expresses these relationships. Then we consider the implications of our findings for some of the philosophical conundrums entailed by the apparent “explanatory gap” between the brain and phenomenal consciousness. We conclude that consciousness stems from the personal life of an organism with the addition of a complex nervous system that is ideally suited to maximize emergent neurobiological features and that it is an example of standard (“weak”) emergence without a scientific explanatory gap. An “experiential” or epistemic gap remains, although this is ontologically untroubling.
format Online
Article
Text
id pubmed-7304239
institution National Center for Biotechnology Information
language English
publishDate 2020
publisher Frontiers Media S.A.
record_format MEDLINE/PubMed
spelling pubmed-73042392020-06-26 Phenomenal Consciousness and Emergence: Eliminating the Explanatory Gap Feinberg, Todd E. Mallatt, Jon Front Psychol Psychology The role of emergence in the creation of consciousness has been debated for over a century, but it remains unresolved. In particular there is controversy over the claim that a “strong” or radical form of emergence is required to explain phenomenal consciousness. In this paper we use some ideas of complex system theory to trace the emergent features of life and then of complex brains through three progressive stages or levels: Level 1 (life), Level 2 (nervous systems), and Level 3 (special neurobiological features), each representing increasing biological and neurobiological complexity and ultimately leading to the emergence of phenomenal consciousness, all in physical systems. Along the way we show that consciousness fits the criteria of an emergent property—albeit one with extreme complexity. The formulation Life + Special neurobiological features → Phenomenal consciousness expresses these relationships. Then we consider the implications of our findings for some of the philosophical conundrums entailed by the apparent “explanatory gap” between the brain and phenomenal consciousness. We conclude that consciousness stems from the personal life of an organism with the addition of a complex nervous system that is ideally suited to maximize emergent neurobiological features and that it is an example of standard (“weak”) emergence without a scientific explanatory gap. An “experiential” or epistemic gap remains, although this is ontologically untroubling. Frontiers Media S.A. 2020-06-12 /pmc/articles/PMC7304239/ /pubmed/32595555 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01041 Text en Copyright © 2020 Feinberg and Mallatt. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
spellingShingle Psychology
Feinberg, Todd E.
Mallatt, Jon
Phenomenal Consciousness and Emergence: Eliminating the Explanatory Gap
title Phenomenal Consciousness and Emergence: Eliminating the Explanatory Gap
title_full Phenomenal Consciousness and Emergence: Eliminating the Explanatory Gap
title_fullStr Phenomenal Consciousness and Emergence: Eliminating the Explanatory Gap
title_full_unstemmed Phenomenal Consciousness and Emergence: Eliminating the Explanatory Gap
title_short Phenomenal Consciousness and Emergence: Eliminating the Explanatory Gap
title_sort phenomenal consciousness and emergence: eliminating the explanatory gap
topic Psychology
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7304239/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32595555
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01041
work_keys_str_mv AT feinbergtodde phenomenalconsciousnessandemergenceeliminatingtheexplanatorygap
AT mallattjon phenomenalconsciousnessandemergenceeliminatingtheexplanatorygap