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P-hacking in clinical trials and how incentives shape the distribution of results across phases

Clinical research should conform to high standards of ethical and scientific integrity, given that human lives are at stake. However, economic incentives can generate conflicts of interest for investigators, who may be inclined to withhold unfavorable results or even tamper with data in order to ach...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Adda, Jérôme, Decker, Christian, Ottaviani, Marco
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: National Academy of Sciences 2020
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7306753/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32487730
http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1919906117
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author Adda, Jérôme
Decker, Christian
Ottaviani, Marco
author_facet Adda, Jérôme
Decker, Christian
Ottaviani, Marco
author_sort Adda, Jérôme
collection PubMed
description Clinical research should conform to high standards of ethical and scientific integrity, given that human lives are at stake. However, economic incentives can generate conflicts of interest for investigators, who may be inclined to withhold unfavorable results or even tamper with data in order to achieve desired outcomes. To shed light on the integrity of clinical trial results, this paper systematically analyzes the distribution of P values of primary outcomes for phase II and phase III drug trials reported to the ClinicalTrials.gov registry. First, we detect no bunching of results just above the classical 5% threshold for statistical significance. Second, a density-discontinuity test reveals an upward jump at the 5% threshold for phase III results by small industry sponsors. Third, we document a larger fraction of significant results in phase III compared to phase II. Linking trials across phases, we find that early favorable results increase the likelihood of continuing into the next phase. Once we take into account this selective continuation, we can explain almost completely the excess of significant results in phase III for trials conducted by large industry sponsors. For small industry sponsors, instead, part of the excess remains unexplained.
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spelling pubmed-73067532020-06-25 P-hacking in clinical trials and how incentives shape the distribution of results across phases Adda, Jérôme Decker, Christian Ottaviani, Marco Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A Social Sciences Clinical research should conform to high standards of ethical and scientific integrity, given that human lives are at stake. However, economic incentives can generate conflicts of interest for investigators, who may be inclined to withhold unfavorable results or even tamper with data in order to achieve desired outcomes. To shed light on the integrity of clinical trial results, this paper systematically analyzes the distribution of P values of primary outcomes for phase II and phase III drug trials reported to the ClinicalTrials.gov registry. First, we detect no bunching of results just above the classical 5% threshold for statistical significance. Second, a density-discontinuity test reveals an upward jump at the 5% threshold for phase III results by small industry sponsors. Third, we document a larger fraction of significant results in phase III compared to phase II. Linking trials across phases, we find that early favorable results increase the likelihood of continuing into the next phase. Once we take into account this selective continuation, we can explain almost completely the excess of significant results in phase III for trials conducted by large industry sponsors. For small industry sponsors, instead, part of the excess remains unexplained. National Academy of Sciences 2020-06-16 2020-06-02 /pmc/articles/PMC7306753/ /pubmed/32487730 http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1919906117 Text en Copyright © 2020 the Author(s). Published by PNAS. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/This open access article is distributed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License 4.0 (CC BY-NC-ND) (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) .
spellingShingle Social Sciences
Adda, Jérôme
Decker, Christian
Ottaviani, Marco
P-hacking in clinical trials and how incentives shape the distribution of results across phases
title P-hacking in clinical trials and how incentives shape the distribution of results across phases
title_full P-hacking in clinical trials and how incentives shape the distribution of results across phases
title_fullStr P-hacking in clinical trials and how incentives shape the distribution of results across phases
title_full_unstemmed P-hacking in clinical trials and how incentives shape the distribution of results across phases
title_short P-hacking in clinical trials and how incentives shape the distribution of results across phases
title_sort p-hacking in clinical trials and how incentives shape the distribution of results across phases
topic Social Sciences
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7306753/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32487730
http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1919906117
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