Cargando…
A Broken Antibiotic Market: Review of Strategies to Incentivize Drug Development
The threat posed by infections arising from antimicrobial-resistant bacteria is a global concern. Despite this trend, the future development of new antimicrobial agents is currently very uncertain. The lack of commercial success for newly launched antimicrobial agents provides little incentive to in...
Autores principales: | , , |
---|---|
Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Oxford University Press
2020
|
Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7336557/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32667365 http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ofid/ofaa083 |
_version_ | 1783554340819042304 |
---|---|
author | Bhavnani, Sujata M Krause, Kevin M Ambrose, Paul G |
author_facet | Bhavnani, Sujata M Krause, Kevin M Ambrose, Paul G |
author_sort | Bhavnani, Sujata M |
collection | PubMed |
description | The threat posed by infections arising from antimicrobial-resistant bacteria is a global concern. Despite this trend, the future development of new antimicrobial agents is currently very uncertain. The lack of commercial success for newly launched antimicrobial agents provides little incentive to invest in the development of new agents. To address this crisis, a number of push and pull incentives have been constructed to support antimicrobial drug development. Push incentives, which are designed to lower the cost of developing new antimicrobial agents, include grants, contracts, public-private partnerships, tax credits, and clinical trial networks. Pull incentives, which are designed to facilitate higher financial returns for a newly launched antimicrobial agent, include those that decrease the time for a regulatory review, extend patent exclusivity, or provide premium pricing. Such incentives may also include direct, advanced, or milestone payments or they may be insurance-based whereby healthcare systems pay for the right to access an antimicrobial agent rather than the number of units administered. Another strategy involves the re-evaluation of interpretive criteria for in vitro susceptibility testing (susceptibility breakpoints) of old antimicrobial agents using the same standards applied to those of new agents, which will allow for an accurate determination of antimicrobial resistance. Although each of the above-described strategies will be important to ensure that antimicrobial agents are developed in the decades to come, the update of susceptibility breakpoints for old agents is a strategy that could be implemented quickly and one that could be the most effective for incentivizing drug developers and financiers to reconsider the development of antimicrobial agents. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-7336557 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2020 |
publisher | Oxford University Press |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-73365572020-07-13 A Broken Antibiotic Market: Review of Strategies to Incentivize Drug Development Bhavnani, Sujata M Krause, Kevin M Ambrose, Paul G Open Forum Infect Dis Major Articles The threat posed by infections arising from antimicrobial-resistant bacteria is a global concern. Despite this trend, the future development of new antimicrobial agents is currently very uncertain. The lack of commercial success for newly launched antimicrobial agents provides little incentive to invest in the development of new agents. To address this crisis, a number of push and pull incentives have been constructed to support antimicrobial drug development. Push incentives, which are designed to lower the cost of developing new antimicrobial agents, include grants, contracts, public-private partnerships, tax credits, and clinical trial networks. Pull incentives, which are designed to facilitate higher financial returns for a newly launched antimicrobial agent, include those that decrease the time for a regulatory review, extend patent exclusivity, or provide premium pricing. Such incentives may also include direct, advanced, or milestone payments or they may be insurance-based whereby healthcare systems pay for the right to access an antimicrobial agent rather than the number of units administered. Another strategy involves the re-evaluation of interpretive criteria for in vitro susceptibility testing (susceptibility breakpoints) of old antimicrobial agents using the same standards applied to those of new agents, which will allow for an accurate determination of antimicrobial resistance. Although each of the above-described strategies will be important to ensure that antimicrobial agents are developed in the decades to come, the update of susceptibility breakpoints for old agents is a strategy that could be implemented quickly and one that could be the most effective for incentivizing drug developers and financiers to reconsider the development of antimicrobial agents. Oxford University Press 2020-03-13 /pmc/articles/PMC7336557/ /pubmed/32667365 http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ofid/ofaa083 Text en © The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Infectious Diseases Society of America. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact journals.permissions@oup.com |
spellingShingle | Major Articles Bhavnani, Sujata M Krause, Kevin M Ambrose, Paul G A Broken Antibiotic Market: Review of Strategies to Incentivize Drug Development |
title | A Broken Antibiotic Market: Review of Strategies to Incentivize Drug Development |
title_full | A Broken Antibiotic Market: Review of Strategies to Incentivize Drug Development |
title_fullStr | A Broken Antibiotic Market: Review of Strategies to Incentivize Drug Development |
title_full_unstemmed | A Broken Antibiotic Market: Review of Strategies to Incentivize Drug Development |
title_short | A Broken Antibiotic Market: Review of Strategies to Incentivize Drug Development |
title_sort | broken antibiotic market: review of strategies to incentivize drug development |
topic | Major Articles |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7336557/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32667365 http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ofid/ofaa083 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT bhavnanisujatam abrokenantibioticmarketreviewofstrategiestoincentivizedrugdevelopment AT krausekevinm abrokenantibioticmarketreviewofstrategiestoincentivizedrugdevelopment AT ambrosepaulg abrokenantibioticmarketreviewofstrategiestoincentivizedrugdevelopment AT bhavnanisujatam brokenantibioticmarketreviewofstrategiestoincentivizedrugdevelopment AT krausekevinm brokenantibioticmarketreviewofstrategiestoincentivizedrugdevelopment AT ambrosepaulg brokenantibioticmarketreviewofstrategiestoincentivizedrugdevelopment |