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The science of consciousness does not need another theory, it needs a minimal unifying model

This article discusses a hypothesis recently put forward by Kanai et al., according to which information generation constitutes a functional basis of, and a sufficient condition for, consciousness. Information generation involves the ability to compress and subsequently decompress information, poten...

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Autor principal: Wiese, Wanja
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Oxford University Press 2020
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7352491/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32676200
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/nc/niaa013
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author Wiese, Wanja
author_facet Wiese, Wanja
author_sort Wiese, Wanja
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description This article discusses a hypothesis recently put forward by Kanai et al., according to which information generation constitutes a functional basis of, and a sufficient condition for, consciousness. Information generation involves the ability to compress and subsequently decompress information, potentially after a temporal delay and adapted to current purposes. I will argue that information generation should not be regarded as a sufficient condition for consciousness, but could serve as what I will call a “minimal unifying model of consciousness.” A minimal unifying model (MUM) specifies at least one necessary feature of consciousness, characterizes it in a determinable way, and shows that it is entailed by (many) existing theories of consciousness. Information generation fulfills these requirements. A MUM of consciousness is useful, because it unifies existing theories of consciousness by highlighting their common assumptions, while enabling further developments from which empirical predictions can be derived. Unlike existing theories (which probably contain at least some false assumptions), a MUM is thus likely to be an adequate model of consciousness, albeit at a relatively general level. Assumptions embodied in such a model are less informative than assumptions made by more specific theories and hence function more in the way of guiding principles. Still, they enable further refinements, in line with new empirical results and broader theoretical and evolutionary considerations. This also allows developing the model in ways that facilitate more specific claims and predictions.
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spelling pubmed-73524912020-07-15 The science of consciousness does not need another theory, it needs a minimal unifying model Wiese, Wanja Neurosci Conscious Research Article This article discusses a hypothesis recently put forward by Kanai et al., according to which information generation constitutes a functional basis of, and a sufficient condition for, consciousness. Information generation involves the ability to compress and subsequently decompress information, potentially after a temporal delay and adapted to current purposes. I will argue that information generation should not be regarded as a sufficient condition for consciousness, but could serve as what I will call a “minimal unifying model of consciousness.” A minimal unifying model (MUM) specifies at least one necessary feature of consciousness, characterizes it in a determinable way, and shows that it is entailed by (many) existing theories of consciousness. Information generation fulfills these requirements. A MUM of consciousness is useful, because it unifies existing theories of consciousness by highlighting their common assumptions, while enabling further developments from which empirical predictions can be derived. Unlike existing theories (which probably contain at least some false assumptions), a MUM is thus likely to be an adequate model of consciousness, albeit at a relatively general level. Assumptions embodied in such a model are less informative than assumptions made by more specific theories and hence function more in the way of guiding principles. Still, they enable further refinements, in line with new empirical results and broader theoretical and evolutionary considerations. This also allows developing the model in ways that facilitate more specific claims and predictions. Oxford University Press 2020-07-11 /pmc/articles/PMC7352491/ /pubmed/32676200 http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/nc/niaa013 Text en © The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
spellingShingle Research Article
Wiese, Wanja
The science of consciousness does not need another theory, it needs a minimal unifying model
title The science of consciousness does not need another theory, it needs a minimal unifying model
title_full The science of consciousness does not need another theory, it needs a minimal unifying model
title_fullStr The science of consciousness does not need another theory, it needs a minimal unifying model
title_full_unstemmed The science of consciousness does not need another theory, it needs a minimal unifying model
title_short The science of consciousness does not need another theory, it needs a minimal unifying model
title_sort science of consciousness does not need another theory, it needs a minimal unifying model
topic Research Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7352491/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32676200
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/nc/niaa013
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