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Public and private incentives for self-protection
Governments sometimes encourage or impose individual self-protection measures, such as wearing a protective mask in public during an epidemic. However, by reducing the risk of being infected by others, more self-protection may lead each individual to go outside the house more often. In the absence o...
Autores principales: | , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Palgrave Macmillan UK
2020
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7371964/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32837395 http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/s10713-020-00050-3 |
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author | Salanié, François Treich, Nicolas |
author_facet | Salanié, François Treich, Nicolas |
author_sort | Salanié, François |
collection | PubMed |
description | Governments sometimes encourage or impose individual self-protection measures, such as wearing a protective mask in public during an epidemic. However, by reducing the risk of being infected by others, more self-protection may lead each individual to go outside the house more often. In the absence of lockdown, this creates a “collective offsetting effect”, since more people outside means that the risk of infection is increased for all. However, wearing masks also creates a positive externality on others, by reducing the risk of infecting them. We show how to integrate these different effects in a simple model, and we discuss when self-protection efforts should be encouraged (or deterred) by a social planner. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-7371964 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2020 |
publisher | Palgrave Macmillan UK |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-73719642020-07-21 Public and private incentives for self-protection Salanié, François Treich, Nicolas Geneva Risk Insur Rev Original Article Governments sometimes encourage or impose individual self-protection measures, such as wearing a protective mask in public during an epidemic. However, by reducing the risk of being infected by others, more self-protection may lead each individual to go outside the house more often. In the absence of lockdown, this creates a “collective offsetting effect”, since more people outside means that the risk of infection is increased for all. However, wearing masks also creates a positive externality on others, by reducing the risk of infecting them. We show how to integrate these different effects in a simple model, and we discuss when self-protection efforts should be encouraged (or deterred) by a social planner. Palgrave Macmillan UK 2020-07-21 2020 /pmc/articles/PMC7371964/ /pubmed/32837395 http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/s10713-020-00050-3 Text en © International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics 2020 This article is made available via the PMC Open Access Subset for unrestricted research re-use and secondary analysis in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source. These permissions are granted for the duration of the World Health Organization (WHO) declaration of COVID-19 as a global pandemic. |
spellingShingle | Original Article Salanié, François Treich, Nicolas Public and private incentives for self-protection |
title | Public and private incentives for self-protection |
title_full | Public and private incentives for self-protection |
title_fullStr | Public and private incentives for self-protection |
title_full_unstemmed | Public and private incentives for self-protection |
title_short | Public and private incentives for self-protection |
title_sort | public and private incentives for self-protection |
topic | Original Article |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7371964/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32837395 http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/s10713-020-00050-3 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT salaniefrancois publicandprivateincentivesforselfprotection AT treichnicolas publicandprivateincentivesforselfprotection |