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Public and private incentives for self-protection

Governments sometimes encourage or impose individual self-protection measures, such as wearing a protective mask in public during an epidemic. However, by reducing the risk of being infected by others, more self-protection may lead each individual to go outside the house more often. In the absence o...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Salanié, François, Treich, Nicolas
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Palgrave Macmillan UK 2020
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7371964/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32837395
http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/s10713-020-00050-3
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author Salanié, François
Treich, Nicolas
author_facet Salanié, François
Treich, Nicolas
author_sort Salanié, François
collection PubMed
description Governments sometimes encourage or impose individual self-protection measures, such as wearing a protective mask in public during an epidemic. However, by reducing the risk of being infected by others, more self-protection may lead each individual to go outside the house more often. In the absence of lockdown, this creates a “collective offsetting effect”, since more people outside means that the risk of infection is increased for all. However, wearing masks also creates a positive externality on others, by reducing the risk of infecting them. We show how to integrate these different effects in a simple model, and we discuss when self-protection efforts should be encouraged (or deterred) by a social planner.
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spelling pubmed-73719642020-07-21 Public and private incentives for self-protection Salanié, François Treich, Nicolas Geneva Risk Insur Rev Original Article Governments sometimes encourage or impose individual self-protection measures, such as wearing a protective mask in public during an epidemic. However, by reducing the risk of being infected by others, more self-protection may lead each individual to go outside the house more often. In the absence of lockdown, this creates a “collective offsetting effect”, since more people outside means that the risk of infection is increased for all. However, wearing masks also creates a positive externality on others, by reducing the risk of infecting them. We show how to integrate these different effects in a simple model, and we discuss when self-protection efforts should be encouraged (or deterred) by a social planner. Palgrave Macmillan UK 2020-07-21 2020 /pmc/articles/PMC7371964/ /pubmed/32837395 http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/s10713-020-00050-3 Text en © International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics 2020 This article is made available via the PMC Open Access Subset for unrestricted research re-use and secondary analysis in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source. These permissions are granted for the duration of the World Health Organization (WHO) declaration of COVID-19 as a global pandemic.
spellingShingle Original Article
Salanié, François
Treich, Nicolas
Public and private incentives for self-protection
title Public and private incentives for self-protection
title_full Public and private incentives for self-protection
title_fullStr Public and private incentives for self-protection
title_full_unstemmed Public and private incentives for self-protection
title_short Public and private incentives for self-protection
title_sort public and private incentives for self-protection
topic Original Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7371964/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32837395
http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/s10713-020-00050-3
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