Cargando…

Building biosecurity for synthetic biology

The fast‐paced field of synthetic biology is fundamentally changing the global biosecurity framework. Current biosecurity regulations and strategies are based on previous governance paradigms for pathogen‐oriented security, recombinant DNA research, and broader concerns related to genetically modifi...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Trump, Benjamin D, Galaitsi, SE, Appleton, Evan, Bleijs, Diederik A, Florin, Marie‐Valentine, Gollihar, Jimmy D, Hamilton, R Alexander, Kuiken, Todd, Lentzos, Filippa, Mampuys, Ruth, Merad, Myriam, Novossiolova, Tatyana, Oye, Kenneth, Perkins, Edward, Garcia‐Reyero, Natàlia, Rhodes, Catherine, Linkov, Igor
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: John Wiley and Sons Inc. 2020
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7373080/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32692486
http://dx.doi.org/10.15252/msb.20209723
_version_ 1783561439630327808
author Trump, Benjamin D
Galaitsi, SE
Appleton, Evan
Bleijs, Diederik A
Florin, Marie‐Valentine
Gollihar, Jimmy D
Hamilton, R Alexander
Kuiken, Todd
Lentzos, Filippa
Mampuys, Ruth
Merad, Myriam
Novossiolova, Tatyana
Oye, Kenneth
Perkins, Edward
Garcia‐Reyero, Natàlia
Rhodes, Catherine
Linkov, Igor
author_facet Trump, Benjamin D
Galaitsi, SE
Appleton, Evan
Bleijs, Diederik A
Florin, Marie‐Valentine
Gollihar, Jimmy D
Hamilton, R Alexander
Kuiken, Todd
Lentzos, Filippa
Mampuys, Ruth
Merad, Myriam
Novossiolova, Tatyana
Oye, Kenneth
Perkins, Edward
Garcia‐Reyero, Natàlia
Rhodes, Catherine
Linkov, Igor
author_sort Trump, Benjamin D
collection PubMed
description The fast‐paced field of synthetic biology is fundamentally changing the global biosecurity framework. Current biosecurity regulations and strategies are based on previous governance paradigms for pathogen‐oriented security, recombinant DNA research, and broader concerns related to genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Many scholarly discussions and biosecurity practitioners are therefore concerned that synthetic biology outpaces established biosafety and biosecurity measures to prevent deliberate and malicious or inadvertent and accidental misuse of synthetic biology's processes or products. This commentary proposes three strategies to improve biosecurity: Security must be treated as an investment in the future applicability of the technology; social scientists and policy makers should be engaged early in technology development and forecasting; and coordination among global stakeholders is necessary to ensure acceptable levels of risk.
format Online
Article
Text
id pubmed-7373080
institution National Center for Biotechnology Information
language English
publishDate 2020
publisher John Wiley and Sons Inc.
record_format MEDLINE/PubMed
spelling pubmed-73730802020-07-22 Building biosecurity for synthetic biology Trump, Benjamin D Galaitsi, SE Appleton, Evan Bleijs, Diederik A Florin, Marie‐Valentine Gollihar, Jimmy D Hamilton, R Alexander Kuiken, Todd Lentzos, Filippa Mampuys, Ruth Merad, Myriam Novossiolova, Tatyana Oye, Kenneth Perkins, Edward Garcia‐Reyero, Natàlia Rhodes, Catherine Linkov, Igor Mol Syst Biol Commentary The fast‐paced field of synthetic biology is fundamentally changing the global biosecurity framework. Current biosecurity regulations and strategies are based on previous governance paradigms for pathogen‐oriented security, recombinant DNA research, and broader concerns related to genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Many scholarly discussions and biosecurity practitioners are therefore concerned that synthetic biology outpaces established biosafety and biosecurity measures to prevent deliberate and malicious or inadvertent and accidental misuse of synthetic biology's processes or products. This commentary proposes three strategies to improve biosecurity: Security must be treated as an investment in the future applicability of the technology; social scientists and policy makers should be engaged early in technology development and forecasting; and coordination among global stakeholders is necessary to ensure acceptable levels of risk. John Wiley and Sons Inc. 2020-07-21 /pmc/articles/PMC7373080/ /pubmed/32692486 http://dx.doi.org/10.15252/msb.20209723 Text en © 2020 The Authors. Published under the terms of the CC BY 4.0 license This is an open access article under the terms of the http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
spellingShingle Commentary
Trump, Benjamin D
Galaitsi, SE
Appleton, Evan
Bleijs, Diederik A
Florin, Marie‐Valentine
Gollihar, Jimmy D
Hamilton, R Alexander
Kuiken, Todd
Lentzos, Filippa
Mampuys, Ruth
Merad, Myriam
Novossiolova, Tatyana
Oye, Kenneth
Perkins, Edward
Garcia‐Reyero, Natàlia
Rhodes, Catherine
Linkov, Igor
Building biosecurity for synthetic biology
title Building biosecurity for synthetic biology
title_full Building biosecurity for synthetic biology
title_fullStr Building biosecurity for synthetic biology
title_full_unstemmed Building biosecurity for synthetic biology
title_short Building biosecurity for synthetic biology
title_sort building biosecurity for synthetic biology
topic Commentary
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7373080/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32692486
http://dx.doi.org/10.15252/msb.20209723
work_keys_str_mv AT trumpbenjamind buildingbiosecurityforsyntheticbiology
AT galaitsise buildingbiosecurityforsyntheticbiology
AT appletonevan buildingbiosecurityforsyntheticbiology
AT bleijsdiederika buildingbiosecurityforsyntheticbiology
AT florinmarievalentine buildingbiosecurityforsyntheticbiology
AT golliharjimmyd buildingbiosecurityforsyntheticbiology
AT hamiltonralexander buildingbiosecurityforsyntheticbiology
AT kuikentodd buildingbiosecurityforsyntheticbiology
AT lentzosfilippa buildingbiosecurityforsyntheticbiology
AT mampuysruth buildingbiosecurityforsyntheticbiology
AT meradmyriam buildingbiosecurityforsyntheticbiology
AT novossiolovatatyana buildingbiosecurityforsyntheticbiology
AT oyekenneth buildingbiosecurityforsyntheticbiology
AT perkinsedward buildingbiosecurityforsyntheticbiology
AT garciareyeronatalia buildingbiosecurityforsyntheticbiology
AT rhodescatherine buildingbiosecurityforsyntheticbiology
AT linkovigor buildingbiosecurityforsyntheticbiology