Game Analysis on the Evolution of Decision-Making of Vaccine Manufacturing Enterprises under the Government Regulation Model

The harm caused by defective vaccines to human health and social stability is immeasurable. Aiming at the government’s supervision of the vaccine market, an evolutionary game model is constructed to analyze the quality of supervision and the key factors in the dynamic interaction between government...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Zhang, Na, Yang, Yingjie, Wang, Xiaodong, Wang, Xinfeng
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: MDPI 2020
Materias:
Article
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7378765/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32486520
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/vaccines8020267

Internet

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7378765/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32486520
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/vaccines8020267

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