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Automata representation of successful strategies for social dilemmas
In a social dilemma, cooperation is collectively optimal, yet individually each group member prefers to defect. A class of successful strategies of direct reciprocity were recently found for the iterated prisoner’s dilemma and for the iterated three-person public-goods game: By a successful strategy...
Autores principales: | Murase, Yohsuke, Baek, Seung Ki |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Nature Publishing Group UK
2020
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7414846/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32770157 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-70281-x |
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