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The stability of conditional cooperation: beliefs alone cannot explain the decline of cooperation in social dilemmas
An often-replicated result in the experimental literature on social dilemmas is that a large share of subjects choose conditionally cooperative strategies. Cooperation generated by such choices is notoriously unstable, as individuals reduce their contributions to the public good in reaction to other...
Autores principales: | Andreozzi, Luciano, Ploner, Matteo, Saral, Ali Seyhun |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Nature Publishing Group UK
2020
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7423935/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32788712 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-70681-z |
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