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Applying the Bayesian Stackelberg Active Deception Game for Securing Infrastructure Networks

With new security threats cropping up every day, finding a real-time and smart protection strategy for critical infrastructure has become a big challenge. Game theory is suitable for solving this problem, for it provides a theoretical framework for analyzing the intelligent decisions from both attac...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Zeng, Chengyi, Ren, Baoan, Liu, Hongfu, Chen, Jing
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: MDPI 2019
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7515438/
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e21090909
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author Zeng, Chengyi
Ren, Baoan
Liu, Hongfu
Chen, Jing
author_facet Zeng, Chengyi
Ren, Baoan
Liu, Hongfu
Chen, Jing
author_sort Zeng, Chengyi
collection PubMed
description With new security threats cropping up every day, finding a real-time and smart protection strategy for critical infrastructure has become a big challenge. Game theory is suitable for solving this problem, for it provides a theoretical framework for analyzing the intelligent decisions from both attackers and defenders. However, existing methods are only based on complete information and only consider a single type of attacker, which is not always available in realistic situations. Furthermore, although infrastructure interconnection has been greatly improved, there is a lack of methods considering network characteristics. To overcome these limitations, we focus on the problem of infrastructure network protection under asymmetry information. We present a novel method to measure the performance of infrastructure from the network perspective. Moreover, we propose a false network construction method to simulate how the defender applies asymmetric information to defend against the attacker actively. Meanwhile, we consider multiple types of attackers and introduce the Bayesian Stackelberg game to build the model. Experiments in real infrastructure networks reveal that our approach can improve infrastructure protection performance. Our method gives a brand new way to approach the problem of infrastructure security defense.
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spelling pubmed-75154382020-11-09 Applying the Bayesian Stackelberg Active Deception Game for Securing Infrastructure Networks Zeng, Chengyi Ren, Baoan Liu, Hongfu Chen, Jing Entropy (Basel) Article With new security threats cropping up every day, finding a real-time and smart protection strategy for critical infrastructure has become a big challenge. Game theory is suitable for solving this problem, for it provides a theoretical framework for analyzing the intelligent decisions from both attackers and defenders. However, existing methods are only based on complete information and only consider a single type of attacker, which is not always available in realistic situations. Furthermore, although infrastructure interconnection has been greatly improved, there is a lack of methods considering network characteristics. To overcome these limitations, we focus on the problem of infrastructure network protection under asymmetry information. We present a novel method to measure the performance of infrastructure from the network perspective. Moreover, we propose a false network construction method to simulate how the defender applies asymmetric information to defend against the attacker actively. Meanwhile, we consider multiple types of attackers and introduce the Bayesian Stackelberg game to build the model. Experiments in real infrastructure networks reveal that our approach can improve infrastructure protection performance. Our method gives a brand new way to approach the problem of infrastructure security defense. MDPI 2019-09-18 /pmc/articles/PMC7515438/ http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e21090909 Text en © 2019 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
spellingShingle Article
Zeng, Chengyi
Ren, Baoan
Liu, Hongfu
Chen, Jing
Applying the Bayesian Stackelberg Active Deception Game for Securing Infrastructure Networks
title Applying the Bayesian Stackelberg Active Deception Game for Securing Infrastructure Networks
title_full Applying the Bayesian Stackelberg Active Deception Game for Securing Infrastructure Networks
title_fullStr Applying the Bayesian Stackelberg Active Deception Game for Securing Infrastructure Networks
title_full_unstemmed Applying the Bayesian Stackelberg Active Deception Game for Securing Infrastructure Networks
title_short Applying the Bayesian Stackelberg Active Deception Game for Securing Infrastructure Networks
title_sort applying the bayesian stackelberg active deception game for securing infrastructure networks
topic Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7515438/
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e21090909
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