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Central bank independence and the Federal Reserve's new operating regime()

The Federal Reserve is exposed to a greater degree of political influence under its new operating regime. We survey the relevant literature and describe the Fed's new operating regime. Then we explain how the regime change reduced de facto central bank independence. In brief, the regime change...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Jordan, Jerry L., Luther, William J.
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois. Published by Elsevier Inc. 2020
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7554479/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33071531
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2020.10.006
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author Jordan, Jerry L.
Luther, William J.
author_facet Jordan, Jerry L.
Luther, William J.
author_sort Jordan, Jerry L.
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description The Federal Reserve is exposed to a greater degree of political influence under its new operating regime. We survey the relevant literature and describe the Fed's new operating regime. Then we explain how the regime change reduced de facto central bank independence. In brief, the regime change increased the appointment power of the President and improved the bargaining power of Congress. We offer some suggestions for bolstering de facto independence at the Fed.
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spelling pubmed-75544792020-10-14 Central bank independence and the Federal Reserve's new operating regime() Jordan, Jerry L. Luther, William J. Q Rev Econ Finance Article The Federal Reserve is exposed to a greater degree of political influence under its new operating regime. We survey the relevant literature and describe the Fed's new operating regime. Then we explain how the regime change reduced de facto central bank independence. In brief, the regime change increased the appointment power of the President and improved the bargaining power of Congress. We offer some suggestions for bolstering de facto independence at the Fed. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois. Published by Elsevier Inc. 2020-10-14 /pmc/articles/PMC7554479/ /pubmed/33071531 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2020.10.006 Text en © 2020 Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Since January 2020 Elsevier has created a COVID-19 resource centre with free information in English and Mandarin on the novel coronavirus COVID-19. The COVID-19 resource centre is hosted on Elsevier Connect, the company's public news and information website. Elsevier hereby grants permission to make all its COVID-19-related research that is available on the COVID-19 resource centre - including this research content - immediately available in PubMed Central and other publicly funded repositories, such as the WHO COVID database with rights for unrestricted research re-use and analyses in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source. These permissions are granted for free by Elsevier for as long as the COVID-19 resource centre remains active.
spellingShingle Article
Jordan, Jerry L.
Luther, William J.
Central bank independence and the Federal Reserve's new operating regime()
title Central bank independence and the Federal Reserve's new operating regime()
title_full Central bank independence and the Federal Reserve's new operating regime()
title_fullStr Central bank independence and the Federal Reserve's new operating regime()
title_full_unstemmed Central bank independence and the Federal Reserve's new operating regime()
title_short Central bank independence and the Federal Reserve's new operating regime()
title_sort central bank independence and the federal reserve's new operating regime()
topic Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7554479/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33071531
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2020.10.006
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