Cargando…

Fair and Reasonable Allocation of Trans-Boundary Water Resources Based on an Asymmetric Nash Negotiation Model from the Satisfaction Perspective: A Case Study for the Lancang–Mekong River Bain

The issue of trans-boundary water conflict has become an important factor affecting the relations between basin countries. The key to solve the current conflict problem is to realize the fair and reasonable allocation of trans-boundary water resources. Based on the satisfaction perspective, we devel...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Li, Fang, Wu, Feng-ping, Chen, Liu-xin, Zhao, Yue, Chen, Xiang-nan, Shao, Zhi-ying
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: MDPI 2020
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7589104/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33092086
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17207638
_version_ 1783600501763342336
author Li, Fang
Wu, Feng-ping
Chen, Liu-xin
Zhao, Yue
Chen, Xiang-nan
Shao, Zhi-ying
author_facet Li, Fang
Wu, Feng-ping
Chen, Liu-xin
Zhao, Yue
Chen, Xiang-nan
Shao, Zhi-ying
author_sort Li, Fang
collection PubMed
description The issue of trans-boundary water conflict has become an important factor affecting the relations between basin countries. The key to solve the current conflict problem is to realize the fair and reasonable allocation of trans-boundary water resources. Based on the satisfaction perspective, we developed an asymmetric Nash negotiation model to obtain an optimal and feasible allocation scheme for the trans-boundary water resources. Firstly, based on the two international water laws, we analyzed the influencing factors including water demand differences, resource endowment differences, and water efficiency differences, and by combing with the flexible weight constraint, we built the fair and reasonable allocation pattern for trans-boundary water resources. Secondly, under the constraint of the allocation pattern, we determined the ideal negotiation scheme of each basin country by considering their selection preference. Thirdly, we built a satisfaction degree function and established an asymmetric Nash negotiation model. This is used to build a fair negotiation mechanism among basin countries, and the allocation scheme after negotiation is regarded as the optimal allocation scheme. Lastly, we took the Lancang–Mekong river basin as an example. For this example, the results indicate the following: (1) after considering multiple factors comprehensively, China and Thailand obtained a higher proportion of trans-boundary water resource quota under different preference scenarios, while Myanmar obtained a lower proportion of trans-boundary water resource quota; (2) taking each basin country as the negotiation agent, the optimal allocation scheme with the introduction of fair negotiation mechanism has a higher degree of satisfaction, with an average of over 87.19%, which is more stable and easy to be accepted by all basin countries; (3) from the perspective of the change rate and the average satisfaction of the basin countries, the optimal allocation scheme under the resource endowment preference scenario obtained the highest satisfaction among basin countries. This study aims to improve the practicability and acceptability of trans-boundary water resources allocation, thus providing technical support for reducing trans-boundary water resources conflicts.
format Online
Article
Text
id pubmed-7589104
institution National Center for Biotechnology Information
language English
publishDate 2020
publisher MDPI
record_format MEDLINE/PubMed
spelling pubmed-75891042020-10-29 Fair and Reasonable Allocation of Trans-Boundary Water Resources Based on an Asymmetric Nash Negotiation Model from the Satisfaction Perspective: A Case Study for the Lancang–Mekong River Bain Li, Fang Wu, Feng-ping Chen, Liu-xin Zhao, Yue Chen, Xiang-nan Shao, Zhi-ying Int J Environ Res Public Health Article The issue of trans-boundary water conflict has become an important factor affecting the relations between basin countries. The key to solve the current conflict problem is to realize the fair and reasonable allocation of trans-boundary water resources. Based on the satisfaction perspective, we developed an asymmetric Nash negotiation model to obtain an optimal and feasible allocation scheme for the trans-boundary water resources. Firstly, based on the two international water laws, we analyzed the influencing factors including water demand differences, resource endowment differences, and water efficiency differences, and by combing with the flexible weight constraint, we built the fair and reasonable allocation pattern for trans-boundary water resources. Secondly, under the constraint of the allocation pattern, we determined the ideal negotiation scheme of each basin country by considering their selection preference. Thirdly, we built a satisfaction degree function and established an asymmetric Nash negotiation model. This is used to build a fair negotiation mechanism among basin countries, and the allocation scheme after negotiation is regarded as the optimal allocation scheme. Lastly, we took the Lancang–Mekong river basin as an example. For this example, the results indicate the following: (1) after considering multiple factors comprehensively, China and Thailand obtained a higher proportion of trans-boundary water resource quota under different preference scenarios, while Myanmar obtained a lower proportion of trans-boundary water resource quota; (2) taking each basin country as the negotiation agent, the optimal allocation scheme with the introduction of fair negotiation mechanism has a higher degree of satisfaction, with an average of over 87.19%, which is more stable and easy to be accepted by all basin countries; (3) from the perspective of the change rate and the average satisfaction of the basin countries, the optimal allocation scheme under the resource endowment preference scenario obtained the highest satisfaction among basin countries. This study aims to improve the practicability and acceptability of trans-boundary water resources allocation, thus providing technical support for reducing trans-boundary water resources conflicts. MDPI 2020-10-20 2020-10 /pmc/articles/PMC7589104/ /pubmed/33092086 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17207638 Text en © 2020 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
spellingShingle Article
Li, Fang
Wu, Feng-ping
Chen, Liu-xin
Zhao, Yue
Chen, Xiang-nan
Shao, Zhi-ying
Fair and Reasonable Allocation of Trans-Boundary Water Resources Based on an Asymmetric Nash Negotiation Model from the Satisfaction Perspective: A Case Study for the Lancang–Mekong River Bain
title Fair and Reasonable Allocation of Trans-Boundary Water Resources Based on an Asymmetric Nash Negotiation Model from the Satisfaction Perspective: A Case Study for the Lancang–Mekong River Bain
title_full Fair and Reasonable Allocation of Trans-Boundary Water Resources Based on an Asymmetric Nash Negotiation Model from the Satisfaction Perspective: A Case Study for the Lancang–Mekong River Bain
title_fullStr Fair and Reasonable Allocation of Trans-Boundary Water Resources Based on an Asymmetric Nash Negotiation Model from the Satisfaction Perspective: A Case Study for the Lancang–Mekong River Bain
title_full_unstemmed Fair and Reasonable Allocation of Trans-Boundary Water Resources Based on an Asymmetric Nash Negotiation Model from the Satisfaction Perspective: A Case Study for the Lancang–Mekong River Bain
title_short Fair and Reasonable Allocation of Trans-Boundary Water Resources Based on an Asymmetric Nash Negotiation Model from the Satisfaction Perspective: A Case Study for the Lancang–Mekong River Bain
title_sort fair and reasonable allocation of trans-boundary water resources based on an asymmetric nash negotiation model from the satisfaction perspective: a case study for the lancang–mekong river bain
topic Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7589104/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33092086
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17207638
work_keys_str_mv AT lifang fairandreasonableallocationoftransboundarywaterresourcesbasedonanasymmetricnashnegotiationmodelfromthesatisfactionperspectiveacasestudyforthelancangmekongriverbain
AT wufengping fairandreasonableallocationoftransboundarywaterresourcesbasedonanasymmetricnashnegotiationmodelfromthesatisfactionperspectiveacasestudyforthelancangmekongriverbain
AT chenliuxin fairandreasonableallocationoftransboundarywaterresourcesbasedonanasymmetricnashnegotiationmodelfromthesatisfactionperspectiveacasestudyforthelancangmekongriverbain
AT zhaoyue fairandreasonableallocationoftransboundarywaterresourcesbasedonanasymmetricnashnegotiationmodelfromthesatisfactionperspectiveacasestudyforthelancangmekongriverbain
AT chenxiangnan fairandreasonableallocationoftransboundarywaterresourcesbasedonanasymmetricnashnegotiationmodelfromthesatisfactionperspectiveacasestudyforthelancangmekongriverbain
AT shaozhiying fairandreasonableallocationoftransboundarywaterresourcesbasedonanasymmetricnashnegotiationmodelfromthesatisfactionperspectiveacasestudyforthelancangmekongriverbain