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How the incentive to contribute affects contributions in the one-shot public goods game

Enmeshed in various social structures, humans must often weigh their own interest against the interest of others—including the common interest of groups they belong to. The Public Goods Game (PGG), which succinctly pits individual interest against group interest, has been a staple of research into h...

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Autores principales: van den Berg, Pieter, Dewitte, Peter, Aertgeerts, Ine, Wenseleers, Tom
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Nature Publishing Group UK 2020
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7599224/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33127994
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-75729-8
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author van den Berg, Pieter
Dewitte, Peter
Aertgeerts, Ine
Wenseleers, Tom
author_facet van den Berg, Pieter
Dewitte, Peter
Aertgeerts, Ine
Wenseleers, Tom
author_sort van den Berg, Pieter
collection PubMed
description Enmeshed in various social structures, humans must often weigh their own interest against the interest of others—including the common interest of groups they belong to. The Public Goods Game (PGG), which succinctly pits individual interest against group interest, has been a staple of research into how people make such decisions. It has been studied in many variations, in the laboratory and (increasingly) online. One of the defining parameters of the PGG is the marginal per capita return of the group project (MPCR), which determines the incentive for contributing to the group project relative to the incentive of keeping points in the personal account. The effect of MPCR on contributions has been investigated before, but its effects have never been characterised with high resolution. Here, we present a systematic and high-resolution investigation of the effect of MPCR in groups of three. We do this in a large-scale online decision making experiment recruiting participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk. Our results provide a fine-grained account of the relationship between incentive to cooperate on the one hand and cooperation on the other, and can help to provide a basis for choosing MPCR magnitudes for future research endeavours using online PGG studies.
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spelling pubmed-75992242020-11-03 How the incentive to contribute affects contributions in the one-shot public goods game van den Berg, Pieter Dewitte, Peter Aertgeerts, Ine Wenseleers, Tom Sci Rep Article Enmeshed in various social structures, humans must often weigh their own interest against the interest of others—including the common interest of groups they belong to. The Public Goods Game (PGG), which succinctly pits individual interest against group interest, has been a staple of research into how people make such decisions. It has been studied in many variations, in the laboratory and (increasingly) online. One of the defining parameters of the PGG is the marginal per capita return of the group project (MPCR), which determines the incentive for contributing to the group project relative to the incentive of keeping points in the personal account. The effect of MPCR on contributions has been investigated before, but its effects have never been characterised with high resolution. Here, we present a systematic and high-resolution investigation of the effect of MPCR in groups of three. We do this in a large-scale online decision making experiment recruiting participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk. Our results provide a fine-grained account of the relationship between incentive to cooperate on the one hand and cooperation on the other, and can help to provide a basis for choosing MPCR magnitudes for future research endeavours using online PGG studies. Nature Publishing Group UK 2020-10-30 /pmc/articles/PMC7599224/ /pubmed/33127994 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-75729-8 Text en © The Author(s) 2020 Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
spellingShingle Article
van den Berg, Pieter
Dewitte, Peter
Aertgeerts, Ine
Wenseleers, Tom
How the incentive to contribute affects contributions in the one-shot public goods game
title How the incentive to contribute affects contributions in the one-shot public goods game
title_full How the incentive to contribute affects contributions in the one-shot public goods game
title_fullStr How the incentive to contribute affects contributions in the one-shot public goods game
title_full_unstemmed How the incentive to contribute affects contributions in the one-shot public goods game
title_short How the incentive to contribute affects contributions in the one-shot public goods game
title_sort how the incentive to contribute affects contributions in the one-shot public goods game
topic Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7599224/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33127994
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-75729-8
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