Cargando…
Spontaneous divergence of disease status in an economic epidemiological game
We introduce a game inspired by the challenges of disease management in livestock farming and the transmission of endemic disease through a trade network. Success in this game comes from balancing the cost of buying new stock with the risk that it will be carrying some disease. When players follow a...
Autores principales: | , , |
---|---|
Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
The Royal Society Publishing
2020
|
Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7655765/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33214756 http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspa.2019.0837 |
_version_ | 1783608236929187840 |
---|---|
author | Colman, Ewan Hanley, Nick Kao, Rowland R. |
author_facet | Colman, Ewan Hanley, Nick Kao, Rowland R. |
author_sort | Colman, Ewan |
collection | PubMed |
description | We introduce a game inspired by the challenges of disease management in livestock farming and the transmission of endemic disease through a trade network. Success in this game comes from balancing the cost of buying new stock with the risk that it will be carrying some disease. When players follow a simple memory-based strategy we observe a spontaneous separation into two groups corresponding to players with relatively high, or low, levels of infection. By modelling the dynamics of both the disease and the formation and breaking of trade relationships, we derive the conditions for which this separation occurs as a function of the transmission rate and the threshold level of acceptable disease for each player. When interactions in the game are restricted to players that neighbour each other in a small-world network, players tend to have similar levels of infection as their neighbours. We conclude that success in economic-epidemiological systems can originate from misfortune and geographical circumstances as well as by innate differences in personal attitudes towards risk. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-7655765 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2020 |
publisher | The Royal Society Publishing |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-76557652020-11-18 Spontaneous divergence of disease status in an economic epidemiological game Colman, Ewan Hanley, Nick Kao, Rowland R. Proc Math Phys Eng Sci Special Feature We introduce a game inspired by the challenges of disease management in livestock farming and the transmission of endemic disease through a trade network. Success in this game comes from balancing the cost of buying new stock with the risk that it will be carrying some disease. When players follow a simple memory-based strategy we observe a spontaneous separation into two groups corresponding to players with relatively high, or low, levels of infection. By modelling the dynamics of both the disease and the formation and breaking of trade relationships, we derive the conditions for which this separation occurs as a function of the transmission rate and the threshold level of acceptable disease for each player. When interactions in the game are restricted to players that neighbour each other in a small-world network, players tend to have similar levels of infection as their neighbours. We conclude that success in economic-epidemiological systems can originate from misfortune and geographical circumstances as well as by innate differences in personal attitudes towards risk. The Royal Society Publishing 2020-10 2020-10-07 /pmc/articles/PMC7655765/ /pubmed/33214756 http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspa.2019.0837 Text en © 2020 The Authors. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted use, provided the original author and source are credited. |
spellingShingle | Special Feature Colman, Ewan Hanley, Nick Kao, Rowland R. Spontaneous divergence of disease status in an economic epidemiological game |
title | Spontaneous divergence of disease status in an economic epidemiological game |
title_full | Spontaneous divergence of disease status in an economic epidemiological game |
title_fullStr | Spontaneous divergence of disease status in an economic epidemiological game |
title_full_unstemmed | Spontaneous divergence of disease status in an economic epidemiological game |
title_short | Spontaneous divergence of disease status in an economic epidemiological game |
title_sort | spontaneous divergence of disease status in an economic epidemiological game |
topic | Special Feature |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7655765/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33214756 http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspa.2019.0837 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT colmanewan spontaneousdivergenceofdiseasestatusinaneconomicepidemiologicalgame AT hanleynick spontaneousdivergenceofdiseasestatusinaneconomicepidemiologicalgame AT kaorowlandr spontaneousdivergenceofdiseasestatusinaneconomicepidemiologicalgame |