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Explaining Away, Augmentation, and the Assumption of Independence

In reasoning about situations in which several causes lead to a common effect, a much studied and yet still not well-understood inference is that of explaining away. Assuming that the causes contribute independently to the effect, if we learn that the effect is present, then this increases the proba...

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Autores principales: Cruz, Nicole, Hahn, Ulrike, Fenton, Norman, Lagnado, David
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Frontiers Media S.A. 2020
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7670039/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33224043
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.502751
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author Cruz, Nicole
Hahn, Ulrike
Fenton, Norman
Lagnado, David
author_facet Cruz, Nicole
Hahn, Ulrike
Fenton, Norman
Lagnado, David
author_sort Cruz, Nicole
collection PubMed
description In reasoning about situations in which several causes lead to a common effect, a much studied and yet still not well-understood inference is that of explaining away. Assuming that the causes contribute independently to the effect, if we learn that the effect is present, then this increases the probability that one or more of the causes are present. But if we then learn that a particular cause is present, this cause “explains” the presence of the effect, and the probabilities of the other causes decrease again. People tend to show this explaining away effect in their probability judgments, but to a lesser extent than predicted by the causal structure of the situation. We investigated further the conditions under which explaining away is observed. Participants estimated the probability of a cause, given the presence or the absence of another cause, for situations in which the effect was either present or absent, and the evidence about the effect was either certain or uncertain. Responses were compared to predictions obtained using Bayesian network modeling as well as a sensitivity analysis of the size of normative changes in probability under different information conditions. One of the conditions investigated: when there is certainty that the effect is absent, is special because under the assumption of causal independence, the probabilities of the causes remain invariant, that is, there is no normative explaining away or augmentation. This condition is therefore especially diagnostic of people’s reasoning about common-effect structures. The findings suggest that, alongside earlier explanations brought forward in the literature, explaining away may occur less often when the causes are assumed to interact in their contribution to the effect, and when the normative size of the probability change is not large enough to be subjectively meaningful. Further, people struggled when given evidence against negative evidence, resembling a double negation effect.
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spelling pubmed-76700392020-11-20 Explaining Away, Augmentation, and the Assumption of Independence Cruz, Nicole Hahn, Ulrike Fenton, Norman Lagnado, David Front Psychol Psychology In reasoning about situations in which several causes lead to a common effect, a much studied and yet still not well-understood inference is that of explaining away. Assuming that the causes contribute independently to the effect, if we learn that the effect is present, then this increases the probability that one or more of the causes are present. But if we then learn that a particular cause is present, this cause “explains” the presence of the effect, and the probabilities of the other causes decrease again. People tend to show this explaining away effect in their probability judgments, but to a lesser extent than predicted by the causal structure of the situation. We investigated further the conditions under which explaining away is observed. Participants estimated the probability of a cause, given the presence or the absence of another cause, for situations in which the effect was either present or absent, and the evidence about the effect was either certain or uncertain. Responses were compared to predictions obtained using Bayesian network modeling as well as a sensitivity analysis of the size of normative changes in probability under different information conditions. One of the conditions investigated: when there is certainty that the effect is absent, is special because under the assumption of causal independence, the probabilities of the causes remain invariant, that is, there is no normative explaining away or augmentation. This condition is therefore especially diagnostic of people’s reasoning about common-effect structures. The findings suggest that, alongside earlier explanations brought forward in the literature, explaining away may occur less often when the causes are assumed to interact in their contribution to the effect, and when the normative size of the probability change is not large enough to be subjectively meaningful. Further, people struggled when given evidence against negative evidence, resembling a double negation effect. Frontiers Media S.A. 2020-11-03 /pmc/articles/PMC7670039/ /pubmed/33224043 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.502751 Text en Copyright © 2020 Cruz, Hahn, Fenton and Lagnado. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
spellingShingle Psychology
Cruz, Nicole
Hahn, Ulrike
Fenton, Norman
Lagnado, David
Explaining Away, Augmentation, and the Assumption of Independence
title Explaining Away, Augmentation, and the Assumption of Independence
title_full Explaining Away, Augmentation, and the Assumption of Independence
title_fullStr Explaining Away, Augmentation, and the Assumption of Independence
title_full_unstemmed Explaining Away, Augmentation, and the Assumption of Independence
title_short Explaining Away, Augmentation, and the Assumption of Independence
title_sort explaining away, augmentation, and the assumption of independence
topic Psychology
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7670039/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33224043
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.502751
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