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Vicarious representation: A new theory of social cognition

Theory of mind, the attribution of mental states to others is one form of social cognition. The aim of this paper is to highlight the importance of another, much simpler, form of social cognition, which I call vicarious representation. Vicarious representation is the attribution of other-centered pr...

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Autor principal: Nanay, Bence
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Elsevier 2020
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7684465/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32950911
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104451
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author Nanay, Bence
author_facet Nanay, Bence
author_sort Nanay, Bence
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description Theory of mind, the attribution of mental states to others is one form of social cognition. The aim of this paper is to highlight the importance of another, much simpler, form of social cognition, which I call vicarious representation. Vicarious representation is the attribution of other-centered properties to objects. This mental capacity is different from, and much simpler than, theory of mind as it does not imply the understanding (or representation) of the mental (or even perceptual) states of another agents. I argue that the most convincing experiments that are supposed to show that non-human primates have theory of mind in fact demonstrate that they are capable of vicarious representation. The same is true for the experiments about the theory of mind of infants under 12 months.
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spelling pubmed-76844652020-12-07 Vicarious representation: A new theory of social cognition Nanay, Bence Cognition Article Theory of mind, the attribution of mental states to others is one form of social cognition. The aim of this paper is to highlight the importance of another, much simpler, form of social cognition, which I call vicarious representation. Vicarious representation is the attribution of other-centered properties to objects. This mental capacity is different from, and much simpler than, theory of mind as it does not imply the understanding (or representation) of the mental (or even perceptual) states of another agents. I argue that the most convincing experiments that are supposed to show that non-human primates have theory of mind in fact demonstrate that they are capable of vicarious representation. The same is true for the experiments about the theory of mind of infants under 12 months. Elsevier 2020-12 /pmc/articles/PMC7684465/ /pubmed/32950911 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104451 Text en © 2020 The Author(s) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
spellingShingle Article
Nanay, Bence
Vicarious representation: A new theory of social cognition
title Vicarious representation: A new theory of social cognition
title_full Vicarious representation: A new theory of social cognition
title_fullStr Vicarious representation: A new theory of social cognition
title_full_unstemmed Vicarious representation: A new theory of social cognition
title_short Vicarious representation: A new theory of social cognition
title_sort vicarious representation: a new theory of social cognition
topic Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7684465/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32950911
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104451
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