The Limits of Bayesian Thinking in Court

We comment on the contributions of Dahlman and of Fenton et al., who both suggested a Bayesian approach to analyze the Simonshaven case. We argue that analyzing a full case with a Bayesian approach is not feasible, and that there are serious problems with assigning actual numbers to probabilities an...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Meester, Ronald
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: John Wiley and Sons Inc. 2019
Materias:
Models of Rational Proof in Criminal Law Editors: Henry Prakken, Floris Bex and Anne Ruth Mackor
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7687214/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/31670466
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/tops.12478
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author Meester, Ronald
author_facet Meester, Ronald
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description We comment on the contributions of Dahlman and of Fenton et al., who both suggested a Bayesian approach to analyze the Simonshaven case. We argue that analyzing a full case with a Bayesian approach is not feasible, and that there are serious problems with assigning actual numbers to probabilities and priors. We also discuss the nature of Bayesian thinking in court, and the nature and interpretation of the likelihood ratio. In particular, we discuss what it could mean that a likelihood ratio is in some sense uncertain.
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spelling pubmed-76872142020-12-05 The Limits of Bayesian Thinking in Court Meester, Ronald Top Cogn Sci Models of Rational Proof in Criminal Law Editors: Henry Prakken, Floris Bex and Anne Ruth Mackor We comment on the contributions of Dahlman and of Fenton et al., who both suggested a Bayesian approach to analyze the Simonshaven case. We argue that analyzing a full case with a Bayesian approach is not feasible, and that there are serious problems with assigning actual numbers to probabilities and priors. We also discuss the nature of Bayesian thinking in court, and the nature and interpretation of the likelihood ratio. In particular, we discuss what it could mean that a likelihood ratio is in some sense uncertain. John Wiley and Sons Inc. 2019-10-31 2020-10 /pmc/articles/PMC7687214/ /pubmed/31670466 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/tops.12478 Text en © 2019 The Author. Topics in Cognitive Science published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of Cognitive Science Society This is an open access article under the terms of the http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
spellingShingle Models of Rational Proof in Criminal Law Editors: Henry Prakken, Floris Bex and Anne Ruth Mackor
Meester, Ronald
The Limits of Bayesian Thinking in Court
title The Limits of Bayesian Thinking in Court
title_full The Limits of Bayesian Thinking in Court
title_fullStr The Limits of Bayesian Thinking in Court
title_full_unstemmed The Limits of Bayesian Thinking in Court
title_short The Limits of Bayesian Thinking in Court
title_sort limits of bayesian thinking in court
topic Models of Rational Proof in Criminal Law Editors: Henry Prakken, Floris Bex and Anne Ruth Mackor
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7687214/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/31670466
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/tops.12478
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