Cargando…
Is the “Minimally Conscious State” Patient Minimally Self-Aware?
Patients in a Minimally Conscious State (MCS) constitute a subgroup of awareness impaired patients who show minimal signs of awareness as opposed to patients in a Vegetative State who do not exhibit any such signs. While the empirical literature is rich in studies investigating either overt or cover...
Autor principal: | |
---|---|
Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Frontiers Media S.A.
2020
|
Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7689014/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33281657 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.539665 |
_version_ | 1783613773837238272 |
---|---|
author | Picolas, Constantinos |
author_facet | Picolas, Constantinos |
author_sort | Picolas, Constantinos |
collection | PubMed |
description | Patients in a Minimally Conscious State (MCS) constitute a subgroup of awareness impaired patients who show minimal signs of awareness as opposed to patients in a Vegetative State who do not exhibit any such signs. While the empirical literature is rich in studies investigating either overt or covert signs of awareness in such patients the question of self-awareness has only scarcely been addressed. Even in the occasion where self-awareness is concerned, it is only higher-order or reflective self-awareness that is the target of such investigations. In the first part of this paper, I briefly review the relevant clinical neuroscience literature to demonstrate that the conception of self-awareness at play in such studies is indeed that of reflective self-awareness. In the second part, I present the philosophical notion of pre-reflective (or minimal) self-awareness. This is shown to primarily refer to the implicit awareness of our embodied subjectivity which essentially permeates all our experiences. As discussed, this minimal self-awareness is not specifically addressed when clinically or experimentally assessing patients in MCS. My suggestion is that neuroimaging studies targeting minimal self-awareness as in First-Person Perspective-taking paradigms could be used with MCS patients to shed light on the question of whether those individuals are minimally self-aware even in the case where they lack self-reflective abilities. Empirical evidence of this kind could have important theoretical implications for the discussion about the notion of self-awareness but also potential medical and social/legal implications for awareness impaired patients’ management. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-7689014 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2020 |
publisher | Frontiers Media S.A. |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-76890142020-12-03 Is the “Minimally Conscious State” Patient Minimally Self-Aware? Picolas, Constantinos Front Psychol Psychology Patients in a Minimally Conscious State (MCS) constitute a subgroup of awareness impaired patients who show minimal signs of awareness as opposed to patients in a Vegetative State who do not exhibit any such signs. While the empirical literature is rich in studies investigating either overt or covert signs of awareness in such patients the question of self-awareness has only scarcely been addressed. Even in the occasion where self-awareness is concerned, it is only higher-order or reflective self-awareness that is the target of such investigations. In the first part of this paper, I briefly review the relevant clinical neuroscience literature to demonstrate that the conception of self-awareness at play in such studies is indeed that of reflective self-awareness. In the second part, I present the philosophical notion of pre-reflective (or minimal) self-awareness. This is shown to primarily refer to the implicit awareness of our embodied subjectivity which essentially permeates all our experiences. As discussed, this minimal self-awareness is not specifically addressed when clinically or experimentally assessing patients in MCS. My suggestion is that neuroimaging studies targeting minimal self-awareness as in First-Person Perspective-taking paradigms could be used with MCS patients to shed light on the question of whether those individuals are minimally self-aware even in the case where they lack self-reflective abilities. Empirical evidence of this kind could have important theoretical implications for the discussion about the notion of self-awareness but also potential medical and social/legal implications for awareness impaired patients’ management. Frontiers Media S.A. 2020-11-12 /pmc/articles/PMC7689014/ /pubmed/33281657 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.539665 Text en Copyright © 2020 Picolas. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms. |
spellingShingle | Psychology Picolas, Constantinos Is the “Minimally Conscious State” Patient Minimally Self-Aware? |
title | Is the “Minimally Conscious State” Patient Minimally Self-Aware? |
title_full | Is the “Minimally Conscious State” Patient Minimally Self-Aware? |
title_fullStr | Is the “Minimally Conscious State” Patient Minimally Self-Aware? |
title_full_unstemmed | Is the “Minimally Conscious State” Patient Minimally Self-Aware? |
title_short | Is the “Minimally Conscious State” Patient Minimally Self-Aware? |
title_sort | is the “minimally conscious state” patient minimally self-aware? |
topic | Psychology |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7689014/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33281657 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.539665 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT picolasconstantinos istheminimallyconsciousstatepatientminimallyselfaware |