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Timing Uncertainty in Collective Risk Dilemmas Encourages Group Reciprocation and Polarization
Social dilemmas are often shaped by actions involving uncertain returns only achievable in the future, such as climate action or voluntary vaccination. In this context, uncertainty may produce non-trivial effects. Here, we assess experimentally — through a collective risk dilemma — the effect of tim...
Autores principales: | , , , , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Elsevier
2020
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7701182/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33294777 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.isci.2020.101752 |
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author | Domingos, Elias Fernández Grujić, Jelena Burguillo, Juan C. Kirchsteiger, Georg Santos, Francisco C. Lenaerts, Tom |
author_facet | Domingos, Elias Fernández Grujić, Jelena Burguillo, Juan C. Kirchsteiger, Georg Santos, Francisco C. Lenaerts, Tom |
author_sort | Domingos, Elias Fernández |
collection | PubMed |
description | Social dilemmas are often shaped by actions involving uncertain returns only achievable in the future, such as climate action or voluntary vaccination. In this context, uncertainty may produce non-trivial effects. Here, we assess experimentally — through a collective risk dilemma — the effect of timing uncertainty, i.e. how uncertainty about when a target needs to be reached affects the participants' behaviors. We show that timing uncertainty prompts not only early generosity but also polarized outcomes, where participants' total contributions are distributed unevenly. Furthermore, analyzing participants' behavior under timing uncertainty reveals an increase in reciprocal strategies. A data-driven game-theoretical model captures the self-organizing dynamics underpinning these behavioral patterns. Timing uncertainty thus casts a shadow on the future that leads participants to respond early, whereas reciprocal strategies appear to be important for group success. Yet, the same uncertainty also leads to inequity and polarization, requiring the inclusion of new incentives handling these societal issues. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-7701182 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2020 |
publisher | Elsevier |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-77011822020-12-07 Timing Uncertainty in Collective Risk Dilemmas Encourages Group Reciprocation and Polarization Domingos, Elias Fernández Grujić, Jelena Burguillo, Juan C. Kirchsteiger, Georg Santos, Francisco C. Lenaerts, Tom iScience Article Social dilemmas are often shaped by actions involving uncertain returns only achievable in the future, such as climate action or voluntary vaccination. In this context, uncertainty may produce non-trivial effects. Here, we assess experimentally — through a collective risk dilemma — the effect of timing uncertainty, i.e. how uncertainty about when a target needs to be reached affects the participants' behaviors. We show that timing uncertainty prompts not only early generosity but also polarized outcomes, where participants' total contributions are distributed unevenly. Furthermore, analyzing participants' behavior under timing uncertainty reveals an increase in reciprocal strategies. A data-driven game-theoretical model captures the self-organizing dynamics underpinning these behavioral patterns. Timing uncertainty thus casts a shadow on the future that leads participants to respond early, whereas reciprocal strategies appear to be important for group success. Yet, the same uncertainty also leads to inequity and polarization, requiring the inclusion of new incentives handling these societal issues. Elsevier 2020-10-31 /pmc/articles/PMC7701182/ /pubmed/33294777 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.isci.2020.101752 Text en © 2020 The Authors http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). |
spellingShingle | Article Domingos, Elias Fernández Grujić, Jelena Burguillo, Juan C. Kirchsteiger, Georg Santos, Francisco C. Lenaerts, Tom Timing Uncertainty in Collective Risk Dilemmas Encourages Group Reciprocation and Polarization |
title | Timing Uncertainty in Collective Risk Dilemmas Encourages Group Reciprocation and Polarization |
title_full | Timing Uncertainty in Collective Risk Dilemmas Encourages Group Reciprocation and Polarization |
title_fullStr | Timing Uncertainty in Collective Risk Dilemmas Encourages Group Reciprocation and Polarization |
title_full_unstemmed | Timing Uncertainty in Collective Risk Dilemmas Encourages Group Reciprocation and Polarization |
title_short | Timing Uncertainty in Collective Risk Dilemmas Encourages Group Reciprocation and Polarization |
title_sort | timing uncertainty in collective risk dilemmas encourages group reciprocation and polarization |
topic | Article |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7701182/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33294777 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.isci.2020.101752 |
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