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Timing Uncertainty in Collective Risk Dilemmas Encourages Group Reciprocation and Polarization

Social dilemmas are often shaped by actions involving uncertain returns only achievable in the future, such as climate action or voluntary vaccination. In this context, uncertainty may produce non-trivial effects. Here, we assess experimentally — through a collective risk dilemma — the effect of tim...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Domingos, Elias Fernández, Grujić, Jelena, Burguillo, Juan C., Kirchsteiger, Georg, Santos, Francisco C., Lenaerts, Tom
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Elsevier 2020
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7701182/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33294777
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.isci.2020.101752
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author Domingos, Elias Fernández
Grujić, Jelena
Burguillo, Juan C.
Kirchsteiger, Georg
Santos, Francisco C.
Lenaerts, Tom
author_facet Domingos, Elias Fernández
Grujić, Jelena
Burguillo, Juan C.
Kirchsteiger, Georg
Santos, Francisco C.
Lenaerts, Tom
author_sort Domingos, Elias Fernández
collection PubMed
description Social dilemmas are often shaped by actions involving uncertain returns only achievable in the future, such as climate action or voluntary vaccination. In this context, uncertainty may produce non-trivial effects. Here, we assess experimentally — through a collective risk dilemma — the effect of timing uncertainty, i.e. how uncertainty about when a target needs to be reached affects the participants' behaviors. We show that timing uncertainty prompts not only early generosity but also polarized outcomes, where participants' total contributions are distributed unevenly. Furthermore, analyzing participants' behavior under timing uncertainty reveals an increase in reciprocal strategies. A data-driven game-theoretical model captures the self-organizing dynamics underpinning these behavioral patterns. Timing uncertainty thus casts a shadow on the future that leads participants to respond early, whereas reciprocal strategies appear to be important for group success. Yet, the same uncertainty also leads to inequity and polarization, requiring the inclusion of new incentives handling these societal issues.
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spelling pubmed-77011822020-12-07 Timing Uncertainty in Collective Risk Dilemmas Encourages Group Reciprocation and Polarization Domingos, Elias Fernández Grujić, Jelena Burguillo, Juan C. Kirchsteiger, Georg Santos, Francisco C. Lenaerts, Tom iScience Article Social dilemmas are often shaped by actions involving uncertain returns only achievable in the future, such as climate action or voluntary vaccination. In this context, uncertainty may produce non-trivial effects. Here, we assess experimentally — through a collective risk dilemma — the effect of timing uncertainty, i.e. how uncertainty about when a target needs to be reached affects the participants' behaviors. We show that timing uncertainty prompts not only early generosity but also polarized outcomes, where participants' total contributions are distributed unevenly. Furthermore, analyzing participants' behavior under timing uncertainty reveals an increase in reciprocal strategies. A data-driven game-theoretical model captures the self-organizing dynamics underpinning these behavioral patterns. Timing uncertainty thus casts a shadow on the future that leads participants to respond early, whereas reciprocal strategies appear to be important for group success. Yet, the same uncertainty also leads to inequity and polarization, requiring the inclusion of new incentives handling these societal issues. Elsevier 2020-10-31 /pmc/articles/PMC7701182/ /pubmed/33294777 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.isci.2020.101752 Text en © 2020 The Authors http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
spellingShingle Article
Domingos, Elias Fernández
Grujić, Jelena
Burguillo, Juan C.
Kirchsteiger, Georg
Santos, Francisco C.
Lenaerts, Tom
Timing Uncertainty in Collective Risk Dilemmas Encourages Group Reciprocation and Polarization
title Timing Uncertainty in Collective Risk Dilemmas Encourages Group Reciprocation and Polarization
title_full Timing Uncertainty in Collective Risk Dilemmas Encourages Group Reciprocation and Polarization
title_fullStr Timing Uncertainty in Collective Risk Dilemmas Encourages Group Reciprocation and Polarization
title_full_unstemmed Timing Uncertainty in Collective Risk Dilemmas Encourages Group Reciprocation and Polarization
title_short Timing Uncertainty in Collective Risk Dilemmas Encourages Group Reciprocation and Polarization
title_sort timing uncertainty in collective risk dilemmas encourages group reciprocation and polarization
topic Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7701182/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33294777
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.isci.2020.101752
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