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Can We Set Aside Previous Experience in a Familiar Causal Scenario?
Causal and predictive learning research often employs intuitive and familiar hypothetical scenarios to facilitate learning novel relationships. The allergist task, in which participants are asked to diagnose the allergies of a fictitious patient, is one example of this. In such studies, it is common...
Autores principales: | , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Frontiers Media S.A.
2020
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7734345/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33329230 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.578775 |
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author | Greenaway, Justine K. Livesey, Evan J. |
author_facet | Greenaway, Justine K. Livesey, Evan J. |
author_sort | Greenaway, Justine K. |
collection | PubMed |
description | Causal and predictive learning research often employs intuitive and familiar hypothetical scenarios to facilitate learning novel relationships. The allergist task, in which participants are asked to diagnose the allergies of a fictitious patient, is one example of this. In such studies, it is common practice to ask participants to ignore their existing knowledge of the scenario and make judgments based only on the relationships presented within the experiment. Causal judgments appear to be sensitive to instructions that modify assumptions about the scenario. However, the extent to which prior knowledge continues to affect competition for associative learning, even after participants are instructed to disregard it, is unknown. To answer this, we created a cue competition design that capitalized on prevailing beliefs about the allergenic properties of various foods. High and low allergenic foods were paired with foods moderately associated with allergy to create two compounds; high + moderate and low + moderate. We expected high allergenic foods to produce greater competition for associative memory than low allergenic foods. High allergenic foods may affect learning either because they generate a strong memory of allergy or because they are more salient in the context of the task. We therefore also manipulated the consistency of the high allergenic cue-outcome relationship with prior beliefs about the nature of the allergies. A high allergenic food that is paired with an inconsistent allergenic outcome should generate more prediction error and thus more competition for learning, than one that is consistent with prior beliefs. Participants were instructed to either use or ignore their knowledge of food allergies to complete the task. We found that while participants were able to set aside their prior knowledge when making causal judgments about the foods in question, associative memory was weaker for the cues paired with highly allergenic foods than cues paired with low allergenic foods regardless of instructions. The consistency manipulation had little effect on this result, suggesting that the effects in associative memory are most likely driven by selective attention to highly allergenic cues. This has implications for theories of causal learning as well as the way causal learning tasks are designed. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-7734345 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2020 |
publisher | Frontiers Media S.A. |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-77343452020-12-15 Can We Set Aside Previous Experience in a Familiar Causal Scenario? Greenaway, Justine K. Livesey, Evan J. Front Psychol Psychology Causal and predictive learning research often employs intuitive and familiar hypothetical scenarios to facilitate learning novel relationships. The allergist task, in which participants are asked to diagnose the allergies of a fictitious patient, is one example of this. In such studies, it is common practice to ask participants to ignore their existing knowledge of the scenario and make judgments based only on the relationships presented within the experiment. Causal judgments appear to be sensitive to instructions that modify assumptions about the scenario. However, the extent to which prior knowledge continues to affect competition for associative learning, even after participants are instructed to disregard it, is unknown. To answer this, we created a cue competition design that capitalized on prevailing beliefs about the allergenic properties of various foods. High and low allergenic foods were paired with foods moderately associated with allergy to create two compounds; high + moderate and low + moderate. We expected high allergenic foods to produce greater competition for associative memory than low allergenic foods. High allergenic foods may affect learning either because they generate a strong memory of allergy or because they are more salient in the context of the task. We therefore also manipulated the consistency of the high allergenic cue-outcome relationship with prior beliefs about the nature of the allergies. A high allergenic food that is paired with an inconsistent allergenic outcome should generate more prediction error and thus more competition for learning, than one that is consistent with prior beliefs. Participants were instructed to either use or ignore their knowledge of food allergies to complete the task. We found that while participants were able to set aside their prior knowledge when making causal judgments about the foods in question, associative memory was weaker for the cues paired with highly allergenic foods than cues paired with low allergenic foods regardless of instructions. The consistency manipulation had little effect on this result, suggesting that the effects in associative memory are most likely driven by selective attention to highly allergenic cues. This has implications for theories of causal learning as well as the way causal learning tasks are designed. Frontiers Media S.A. 2020-11-30 /pmc/articles/PMC7734345/ /pubmed/33329230 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.578775 Text en Copyright © 2020 Greenaway and Livesey. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms. |
spellingShingle | Psychology Greenaway, Justine K. Livesey, Evan J. Can We Set Aside Previous Experience in a Familiar Causal Scenario? |
title | Can We Set Aside Previous Experience in a Familiar Causal Scenario? |
title_full | Can We Set Aside Previous Experience in a Familiar Causal Scenario? |
title_fullStr | Can We Set Aside Previous Experience in a Familiar Causal Scenario? |
title_full_unstemmed | Can We Set Aside Previous Experience in a Familiar Causal Scenario? |
title_short | Can We Set Aside Previous Experience in a Familiar Causal Scenario? |
title_sort | can we set aside previous experience in a familiar causal scenario? |
topic | Psychology |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7734345/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33329230 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.578775 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT greenawayjustinek canwesetasidepreviousexperienceinafamiliarcausalscenario AT liveseyevanj canwesetasidepreviousexperienceinafamiliarcausalscenario |