Cargando…

Universal adversarial attacks on deep neural networks for medical image classification

BACKGROUND: Deep neural networks (DNNs) are widely investigated in medical image classification to achieve automated support for clinical diagnosis. It is necessary to evaluate the robustness of medical DNN tasks against adversarial attacks, as high-stake decision-making will be made based on the di...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Hirano, Hokuto, Minagi, Akinori, Takemoto, Kazuhiro
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: BioMed Central 2021
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7792111/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33413181
http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s12880-020-00530-y
_version_ 1783633736249638912
author Hirano, Hokuto
Minagi, Akinori
Takemoto, Kazuhiro
author_facet Hirano, Hokuto
Minagi, Akinori
Takemoto, Kazuhiro
author_sort Hirano, Hokuto
collection PubMed
description BACKGROUND: Deep neural networks (DNNs) are widely investigated in medical image classification to achieve automated support for clinical diagnosis. It is necessary to evaluate the robustness of medical DNN tasks against adversarial attacks, as high-stake decision-making will be made based on the diagnosis. Several previous studies have considered simple adversarial attacks. However, the vulnerability of DNNs to more realistic and higher risk attacks, such as universal adversarial perturbation (UAP), which is a single perturbation that can induce DNN failure in most classification tasks has not been evaluated yet. METHODS: We focus on three representative DNN-based medical image classification tasks (i.e., skin cancer, referable diabetic retinopathy, and pneumonia classifications) and investigate their vulnerability to the seven model architectures of UAPs. RESULTS: We demonstrate that DNNs are vulnerable to both nontargeted UAPs, which cause a task failure resulting in an input being assigned an incorrect class, and to targeted UAPs, which cause the DNN to classify an input into a specific class. The almost imperceptible UAPs achieved > 80% success rates for nontargeted and targeted attacks. The vulnerability to UAPs depended very little on the model architecture. Moreover, we discovered that adversarial retraining, which is known to be an effective method for adversarial defenses, increased DNNs’ robustness against UAPs in only very few cases. CONCLUSION: Unlike previous assumptions, the results indicate that DNN-based clinical diagnosis is easier to deceive because of adversarial attacks. Adversaries can cause failed diagnoses at lower costs (e.g., without consideration of data distribution); moreover, they can affect the diagnosis. The effects of adversarial defenses may not be limited. Our findings emphasize that more careful consideration is required in developing DNNs for medical imaging and their practical applications.
format Online
Article
Text
id pubmed-7792111
institution National Center for Biotechnology Information
language English
publishDate 2021
publisher BioMed Central
record_format MEDLINE/PubMed
spelling pubmed-77921112021-01-11 Universal adversarial attacks on deep neural networks for medical image classification Hirano, Hokuto Minagi, Akinori Takemoto, Kazuhiro BMC Med Imaging Research Article BACKGROUND: Deep neural networks (DNNs) are widely investigated in medical image classification to achieve automated support for clinical diagnosis. It is necessary to evaluate the robustness of medical DNN tasks against adversarial attacks, as high-stake decision-making will be made based on the diagnosis. Several previous studies have considered simple adversarial attacks. However, the vulnerability of DNNs to more realistic and higher risk attacks, such as universal adversarial perturbation (UAP), which is a single perturbation that can induce DNN failure in most classification tasks has not been evaluated yet. METHODS: We focus on three representative DNN-based medical image classification tasks (i.e., skin cancer, referable diabetic retinopathy, and pneumonia classifications) and investigate their vulnerability to the seven model architectures of UAPs. RESULTS: We demonstrate that DNNs are vulnerable to both nontargeted UAPs, which cause a task failure resulting in an input being assigned an incorrect class, and to targeted UAPs, which cause the DNN to classify an input into a specific class. The almost imperceptible UAPs achieved > 80% success rates for nontargeted and targeted attacks. The vulnerability to UAPs depended very little on the model architecture. Moreover, we discovered that adversarial retraining, which is known to be an effective method for adversarial defenses, increased DNNs’ robustness against UAPs in only very few cases. CONCLUSION: Unlike previous assumptions, the results indicate that DNN-based clinical diagnosis is easier to deceive because of adversarial attacks. Adversaries can cause failed diagnoses at lower costs (e.g., without consideration of data distribution); moreover, they can affect the diagnosis. The effects of adversarial defenses may not be limited. Our findings emphasize that more careful consideration is required in developing DNNs for medical imaging and their practical applications. BioMed Central 2021-01-07 /pmc/articles/PMC7792111/ /pubmed/33413181 http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s12880-020-00530-y Text en © The Author(s) 2020 Open AccessThis article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver (http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated in a credit line to the data.
spellingShingle Research Article
Hirano, Hokuto
Minagi, Akinori
Takemoto, Kazuhiro
Universal adversarial attacks on deep neural networks for medical image classification
title Universal adversarial attacks on deep neural networks for medical image classification
title_full Universal adversarial attacks on deep neural networks for medical image classification
title_fullStr Universal adversarial attacks on deep neural networks for medical image classification
title_full_unstemmed Universal adversarial attacks on deep neural networks for medical image classification
title_short Universal adversarial attacks on deep neural networks for medical image classification
title_sort universal adversarial attacks on deep neural networks for medical image classification
topic Research Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7792111/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33413181
http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s12880-020-00530-y
work_keys_str_mv AT hiranohokuto universaladversarialattacksondeepneuralnetworksformedicalimageclassification
AT minagiakinori universaladversarialattacksondeepneuralnetworksformedicalimageclassification
AT takemotokazuhiro universaladversarialattacksondeepneuralnetworksformedicalimageclassification