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Universal adversarial attacks on deep neural networks for medical image classification
BACKGROUND: Deep neural networks (DNNs) are widely investigated in medical image classification to achieve automated support for clinical diagnosis. It is necessary to evaluate the robustness of medical DNN tasks against adversarial attacks, as high-stake decision-making will be made based on the di...
Autores principales: | , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
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BioMed Central
2021
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7792111/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33413181 http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s12880-020-00530-y |
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author | Hirano, Hokuto Minagi, Akinori Takemoto, Kazuhiro |
author_facet | Hirano, Hokuto Minagi, Akinori Takemoto, Kazuhiro |
author_sort | Hirano, Hokuto |
collection | PubMed |
description | BACKGROUND: Deep neural networks (DNNs) are widely investigated in medical image classification to achieve automated support for clinical diagnosis. It is necessary to evaluate the robustness of medical DNN tasks against adversarial attacks, as high-stake decision-making will be made based on the diagnosis. Several previous studies have considered simple adversarial attacks. However, the vulnerability of DNNs to more realistic and higher risk attacks, such as universal adversarial perturbation (UAP), which is a single perturbation that can induce DNN failure in most classification tasks has not been evaluated yet. METHODS: We focus on three representative DNN-based medical image classification tasks (i.e., skin cancer, referable diabetic retinopathy, and pneumonia classifications) and investigate their vulnerability to the seven model architectures of UAPs. RESULTS: We demonstrate that DNNs are vulnerable to both nontargeted UAPs, which cause a task failure resulting in an input being assigned an incorrect class, and to targeted UAPs, which cause the DNN to classify an input into a specific class. The almost imperceptible UAPs achieved > 80% success rates for nontargeted and targeted attacks. The vulnerability to UAPs depended very little on the model architecture. Moreover, we discovered that adversarial retraining, which is known to be an effective method for adversarial defenses, increased DNNs’ robustness against UAPs in only very few cases. CONCLUSION: Unlike previous assumptions, the results indicate that DNN-based clinical diagnosis is easier to deceive because of adversarial attacks. Adversaries can cause failed diagnoses at lower costs (e.g., without consideration of data distribution); moreover, they can affect the diagnosis. The effects of adversarial defenses may not be limited. Our findings emphasize that more careful consideration is required in developing DNNs for medical imaging and their practical applications. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-7792111 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2021 |
publisher | BioMed Central |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-77921112021-01-11 Universal adversarial attacks on deep neural networks for medical image classification Hirano, Hokuto Minagi, Akinori Takemoto, Kazuhiro BMC Med Imaging Research Article BACKGROUND: Deep neural networks (DNNs) are widely investigated in medical image classification to achieve automated support for clinical diagnosis. It is necessary to evaluate the robustness of medical DNN tasks against adversarial attacks, as high-stake decision-making will be made based on the diagnosis. Several previous studies have considered simple adversarial attacks. However, the vulnerability of DNNs to more realistic and higher risk attacks, such as universal adversarial perturbation (UAP), which is a single perturbation that can induce DNN failure in most classification tasks has not been evaluated yet. METHODS: We focus on three representative DNN-based medical image classification tasks (i.e., skin cancer, referable diabetic retinopathy, and pneumonia classifications) and investigate their vulnerability to the seven model architectures of UAPs. RESULTS: We demonstrate that DNNs are vulnerable to both nontargeted UAPs, which cause a task failure resulting in an input being assigned an incorrect class, and to targeted UAPs, which cause the DNN to classify an input into a specific class. The almost imperceptible UAPs achieved > 80% success rates for nontargeted and targeted attacks. The vulnerability to UAPs depended very little on the model architecture. Moreover, we discovered that adversarial retraining, which is known to be an effective method for adversarial defenses, increased DNNs’ robustness against UAPs in only very few cases. CONCLUSION: Unlike previous assumptions, the results indicate that DNN-based clinical diagnosis is easier to deceive because of adversarial attacks. Adversaries can cause failed diagnoses at lower costs (e.g., without consideration of data distribution); moreover, they can affect the diagnosis. The effects of adversarial defenses may not be limited. Our findings emphasize that more careful consideration is required in developing DNNs for medical imaging and their practical applications. BioMed Central 2021-01-07 /pmc/articles/PMC7792111/ /pubmed/33413181 http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s12880-020-00530-y Text en © The Author(s) 2020 Open AccessThis article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver (http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated in a credit line to the data. |
spellingShingle | Research Article Hirano, Hokuto Minagi, Akinori Takemoto, Kazuhiro Universal adversarial attacks on deep neural networks for medical image classification |
title | Universal adversarial attacks on deep neural networks for medical image classification |
title_full | Universal adversarial attacks on deep neural networks for medical image classification |
title_fullStr | Universal adversarial attacks on deep neural networks for medical image classification |
title_full_unstemmed | Universal adversarial attacks on deep neural networks for medical image classification |
title_short | Universal adversarial attacks on deep neural networks for medical image classification |
title_sort | universal adversarial attacks on deep neural networks for medical image classification |
topic | Research Article |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7792111/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33413181 http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s12880-020-00530-y |
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