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Evolutionary Games of Low-Carbon Behaviors of Construction Stakeholders under Carbon Taxes
The development of low-carbon buildings (LCBs) in China has not reached its expected status, although the Chinese government has formulated many relevant regulations. The real estate developers and consumers are essential participants in the development of LCBs. This paper explores whether the gover...
Autores principales: | Du, Qiang, Yan, Yunqing, Huang, Youdan, Hao, Chanchan, Wu, Jiao |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
MDPI
2021
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7827412/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33435506 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph18020508 |
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