Cargando…

A Psychophysical Window onto the Subjective Experience of Compulsion

In this perspective, we follow the idea that an integration of cognitive models with sensorimotor theories of compulsion is required to understand the subjective experience of compulsive action. We argue that cognitive biases in obsessive–compulsive disorder may obscure an altered momentary, pre-ref...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Schmidt, Stefan, Wagner, Gerd, Walter, Martin, Stenner, Max-Philipp
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: MDPI 2021
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7913241/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33540916
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/brainsci11020182
_version_ 1783656760064606208
author Schmidt, Stefan
Wagner, Gerd
Walter, Martin
Stenner, Max-Philipp
author_facet Schmidt, Stefan
Wagner, Gerd
Walter, Martin
Stenner, Max-Philipp
author_sort Schmidt, Stefan
collection PubMed
description In this perspective, we follow the idea that an integration of cognitive models with sensorimotor theories of compulsion is required to understand the subjective experience of compulsive action. We argue that cognitive biases in obsessive–compulsive disorder may obscure an altered momentary, pre-reflective experience of sensorimotor control, whose detection thus requires an implicit experimental operationalization. We propose that a classic psychophysical test exists that provides this implicit operationalization, i.e., the intentional binding paradigm. We show how intentional binding can pit two ideas against each other that are fundamental to current sensorimotor theories of compulsion, i.e., the idea of excessive conscious monitoring of action, and the idea that patients with obsessive–compulsive disorder compensate for diminished conscious access to “internal states”, including states of the body, by relying on more readily observable proxies. Following these ideas, we develop concrete, testable hypotheses on how intentional binding changes under the assumption of different sensorimotor theories of compulsion. Furthermore, we demonstrate how intentional binding provides a touchstone for predictive coding accounts of obsessive–compulsive disorder. A thorough empirical test of the hypotheses developed in this perspective could help explain the puzzling, disabling phenomenon of compulsion, with implications for the normal subjective experience of human action.
format Online
Article
Text
id pubmed-7913241
institution National Center for Biotechnology Information
language English
publishDate 2021
publisher MDPI
record_format MEDLINE/PubMed
spelling pubmed-79132412021-02-28 A Psychophysical Window onto the Subjective Experience of Compulsion Schmidt, Stefan Wagner, Gerd Walter, Martin Stenner, Max-Philipp Brain Sci Opinion In this perspective, we follow the idea that an integration of cognitive models with sensorimotor theories of compulsion is required to understand the subjective experience of compulsive action. We argue that cognitive biases in obsessive–compulsive disorder may obscure an altered momentary, pre-reflective experience of sensorimotor control, whose detection thus requires an implicit experimental operationalization. We propose that a classic psychophysical test exists that provides this implicit operationalization, i.e., the intentional binding paradigm. We show how intentional binding can pit two ideas against each other that are fundamental to current sensorimotor theories of compulsion, i.e., the idea of excessive conscious monitoring of action, and the idea that patients with obsessive–compulsive disorder compensate for diminished conscious access to “internal states”, including states of the body, by relying on more readily observable proxies. Following these ideas, we develop concrete, testable hypotheses on how intentional binding changes under the assumption of different sensorimotor theories of compulsion. Furthermore, we demonstrate how intentional binding provides a touchstone for predictive coding accounts of obsessive–compulsive disorder. A thorough empirical test of the hypotheses developed in this perspective could help explain the puzzling, disabling phenomenon of compulsion, with implications for the normal subjective experience of human action. MDPI 2021-02-02 /pmc/articles/PMC7913241/ /pubmed/33540916 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/brainsci11020182 Text en © 2021 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
spellingShingle Opinion
Schmidt, Stefan
Wagner, Gerd
Walter, Martin
Stenner, Max-Philipp
A Psychophysical Window onto the Subjective Experience of Compulsion
title A Psychophysical Window onto the Subjective Experience of Compulsion
title_full A Psychophysical Window onto the Subjective Experience of Compulsion
title_fullStr A Psychophysical Window onto the Subjective Experience of Compulsion
title_full_unstemmed A Psychophysical Window onto the Subjective Experience of Compulsion
title_short A Psychophysical Window onto the Subjective Experience of Compulsion
title_sort psychophysical window onto the subjective experience of compulsion
topic Opinion
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7913241/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33540916
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/brainsci11020182
work_keys_str_mv AT schmidtstefan apsychophysicalwindowontothesubjectiveexperienceofcompulsion
AT wagnergerd apsychophysicalwindowontothesubjectiveexperienceofcompulsion
AT waltermartin apsychophysicalwindowontothesubjectiveexperienceofcompulsion
AT stennermaxphilipp apsychophysicalwindowontothesubjectiveexperienceofcompulsion
AT schmidtstefan psychophysicalwindowontothesubjectiveexperienceofcompulsion
AT wagnergerd psychophysicalwindowontothesubjectiveexperienceofcompulsion
AT waltermartin psychophysicalwindowontothesubjectiveexperienceofcompulsion
AT stennermaxphilipp psychophysicalwindowontothesubjectiveexperienceofcompulsion