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Monitoring of SARS‐CoV‐2 infection in mustelids
American mink and ferret are highly susceptible to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS‐CoV‐2), but no information is available for other mustelid species. SARS‐CoV‐2 spreads very efficiently within mink farms once introduced, by direct and indirect contact, high within‐farm animal...
Autores principales: | , , , , , , , , , , , , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
John Wiley and Sons Inc.
2021
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7926496/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33717355 http://dx.doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2021.6459 |
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author | Boklund, Anette Gortázar, Christian Pasquali, Paolo Roberts, Helen Nielsen, Søren Saxmose Stahl, Karl Stegeman, Arjan Baldinelli, Francesca Broglia, Alessandro Van Der Stede, Yves Adlhoch, Cornelia Alm, Erik Melidou, Angeliki Mirinaviciute, Grazina |
author_facet | Boklund, Anette Gortázar, Christian Pasquali, Paolo Roberts, Helen Nielsen, Søren Saxmose Stahl, Karl Stegeman, Arjan Baldinelli, Francesca Broglia, Alessandro Van Der Stede, Yves Adlhoch, Cornelia Alm, Erik Melidou, Angeliki Mirinaviciute, Grazina |
collection | PubMed |
description | American mink and ferret are highly susceptible to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS‐CoV‐2), but no information is available for other mustelid species. SARS‐CoV‐2 spreads very efficiently within mink farms once introduced, by direct and indirect contact, high within‐farm animal density increases the chance for transmission. Between‐farm spread is likely to occur once SARS‐CoV‐2 is introduced, short distance between SARS‐CoV‐2 positive farms is a risk factor. As of 29 January 2021, SARS‐CoV‐2 virus has been reported in 400 mink farms in eight countries in the European Union. In most cases, the likely introduction of SARS‐CoV‐2 infection into farms was infected humans. Human health can be at risk by mink‐related variant viruses, which can establish circulation in the community, but so far these have not shown to be more transmissible or causing more severe impact compared with other circulating SARS‐CoV‐2. Concerning animal health risk posed by SARS‐CoV‐2 infection the animal species that may be included in monitoring plans are American mink, ferrets, cats, raccoon dogs, white‐tailed deer and Rhinolophidae bats. All mink farms should be considered at risk of infection; therefore, the monitoring objective should be early detection. This includes passive monitoring (in place in the whole territory of all countries where animals susceptible to SARS‐CoV‐2 are bred) but also active monitoring by regular testing. First, frequent testing of farm personnel and all people in contact with the animals is recommended. Furthermore randomly selected animals (dead or sick animals should be included) should be tested using reverse transcriptase‐polymerase chain reaction (RT‐PCR), ideally at weekly intervals (i.e. design prevalence approximately 5% in each epidemiological unit, to be assessed case by case). Suspected animals (dead or with clinical signs and a minimum five animals) should be tested for confirmation of SARS‐CoV‐2 infection. Positive samples from each farm should be sequenced to monitor virus evolution and results publicly shared. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-7926496 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2021 |
publisher | John Wiley and Sons Inc. |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-79264962021-03-12 Monitoring of SARS‐CoV‐2 infection in mustelids Boklund, Anette Gortázar, Christian Pasquali, Paolo Roberts, Helen Nielsen, Søren Saxmose Stahl, Karl Stegeman, Arjan Baldinelli, Francesca Broglia, Alessandro Van Der Stede, Yves Adlhoch, Cornelia Alm, Erik Melidou, Angeliki Mirinaviciute, Grazina EFSA J Scientific Report American mink and ferret are highly susceptible to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS‐CoV‐2), but no information is available for other mustelid species. SARS‐CoV‐2 spreads very efficiently within mink farms once introduced, by direct and indirect contact, high within‐farm animal density increases the chance for transmission. Between‐farm spread is likely to occur once SARS‐CoV‐2 is introduced, short distance between SARS‐CoV‐2 positive farms is a risk factor. As of 29 January 2021, SARS‐CoV‐2 virus has been reported in 400 mink farms in eight countries in the European Union. In most cases, the likely introduction of SARS‐CoV‐2 infection into farms was infected humans. Human health can be at risk by mink‐related variant viruses, which can establish circulation in the community, but so far these have not shown to be more transmissible or causing more severe impact compared with other circulating SARS‐CoV‐2. Concerning animal health risk posed by SARS‐CoV‐2 infection the animal species that may be included in monitoring plans are American mink, ferrets, cats, raccoon dogs, white‐tailed deer and Rhinolophidae bats. All mink farms should be considered at risk of infection; therefore, the monitoring objective should be early detection. This includes passive monitoring (in place in the whole territory of all countries where animals susceptible to SARS‐CoV‐2 are bred) but also active monitoring by regular testing. First, frequent testing of farm personnel and all people in contact with the animals is recommended. Furthermore randomly selected animals (dead or sick animals should be included) should be tested using reverse transcriptase‐polymerase chain reaction (RT‐PCR), ideally at weekly intervals (i.e. design prevalence approximately 5% in each epidemiological unit, to be assessed case by case). Suspected animals (dead or with clinical signs and a minimum five animals) should be tested for confirmation of SARS‐CoV‐2 infection. Positive samples from each farm should be sequenced to monitor virus evolution and results publicly shared. John Wiley and Sons Inc. 2021-03-03 /pmc/articles/PMC7926496/ /pubmed/33717355 http://dx.doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2021.6459 Text en © 2021 European Food Safety Authority and European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. This is an open access article under the terms of the http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/ License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited and no modifications or adaptations are made. |
spellingShingle | Scientific Report Boklund, Anette Gortázar, Christian Pasquali, Paolo Roberts, Helen Nielsen, Søren Saxmose Stahl, Karl Stegeman, Arjan Baldinelli, Francesca Broglia, Alessandro Van Der Stede, Yves Adlhoch, Cornelia Alm, Erik Melidou, Angeliki Mirinaviciute, Grazina Monitoring of SARS‐CoV‐2 infection in mustelids |
title | Monitoring of SARS‐CoV‐2 infection in mustelids |
title_full | Monitoring of SARS‐CoV‐2 infection in mustelids |
title_fullStr | Monitoring of SARS‐CoV‐2 infection in mustelids |
title_full_unstemmed | Monitoring of SARS‐CoV‐2 infection in mustelids |
title_short | Monitoring of SARS‐CoV‐2 infection in mustelids |
title_sort | monitoring of sars‐cov‐2 infection in mustelids |
topic | Scientific Report |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7926496/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33717355 http://dx.doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2021.6459 |
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