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Monitoring of SARS‐CoV‐2 infection in mustelids

American mink and ferret are highly susceptible to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS‐CoV‐2), but no information is available for other mustelid species. SARS‐CoV‐2 spreads very efficiently within mink farms once introduced, by direct and indirect contact, high within‐farm animal...

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Autores principales: Boklund, Anette, Gortázar, Christian, Pasquali, Paolo, Roberts, Helen, Nielsen, Søren Saxmose, Stahl, Karl, Stegeman, Arjan, Baldinelli, Francesca, Broglia, Alessandro, Van Der Stede, Yves, Adlhoch, Cornelia, Alm, Erik, Melidou, Angeliki, Mirinaviciute, Grazina
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: John Wiley and Sons Inc. 2021
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7926496/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33717355
http://dx.doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2021.6459
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author Boklund, Anette
Gortázar, Christian
Pasquali, Paolo
Roberts, Helen
Nielsen, Søren Saxmose
Stahl, Karl
Stegeman, Arjan
Baldinelli, Francesca
Broglia, Alessandro
Van Der Stede, Yves
Adlhoch, Cornelia
Alm, Erik
Melidou, Angeliki
Mirinaviciute, Grazina
author_facet Boklund, Anette
Gortázar, Christian
Pasquali, Paolo
Roberts, Helen
Nielsen, Søren Saxmose
Stahl, Karl
Stegeman, Arjan
Baldinelli, Francesca
Broglia, Alessandro
Van Der Stede, Yves
Adlhoch, Cornelia
Alm, Erik
Melidou, Angeliki
Mirinaviciute, Grazina
collection PubMed
description American mink and ferret are highly susceptible to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS‐CoV‐2), but no information is available for other mustelid species. SARS‐CoV‐2 spreads very efficiently within mink farms once introduced, by direct and indirect contact, high within‐farm animal density increases the chance for transmission. Between‐farm spread is likely to occur once SARS‐CoV‐2 is introduced, short distance between SARS‐CoV‐2 positive farms is a risk factor. As of 29 January 2021, SARS‐CoV‐2 virus has been reported in 400 mink farms in eight countries in the European Union. In most cases, the likely introduction of SARS‐CoV‐2 infection into farms was infected humans. Human health can be at risk by mink‐related variant viruses, which can establish circulation in the community, but so far these have not shown to be more transmissible or causing more severe impact compared with other circulating SARS‐CoV‐2. Concerning animal health risk posed by SARS‐CoV‐2 infection the animal species that may be included in monitoring plans are American mink, ferrets, cats, raccoon dogs, white‐tailed deer and Rhinolophidae bats. All mink farms should be considered at risk of infection; therefore, the monitoring objective should be early detection. This includes passive monitoring (in place in the whole territory of all countries where animals susceptible to SARS‐CoV‐2 are bred) but also active monitoring by regular testing. First, frequent testing of farm personnel and all people in contact with the animals is recommended. Furthermore randomly selected animals (dead or sick animals should be included) should be tested using reverse transcriptase‐polymerase chain reaction (RT‐PCR), ideally at weekly intervals (i.e. design prevalence approximately 5% in each epidemiological unit, to be assessed case by case). Suspected animals (dead or with clinical signs and a minimum five animals) should be tested for confirmation of SARS‐CoV‐2 infection. Positive samples from each farm should be sequenced to monitor virus evolution and results publicly shared.
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spelling pubmed-79264962021-03-12 Monitoring of SARS‐CoV‐2 infection in mustelids Boklund, Anette Gortázar, Christian Pasquali, Paolo Roberts, Helen Nielsen, Søren Saxmose Stahl, Karl Stegeman, Arjan Baldinelli, Francesca Broglia, Alessandro Van Der Stede, Yves Adlhoch, Cornelia Alm, Erik Melidou, Angeliki Mirinaviciute, Grazina EFSA J Scientific Report American mink and ferret are highly susceptible to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS‐CoV‐2), but no information is available for other mustelid species. SARS‐CoV‐2 spreads very efficiently within mink farms once introduced, by direct and indirect contact, high within‐farm animal density increases the chance for transmission. Between‐farm spread is likely to occur once SARS‐CoV‐2 is introduced, short distance between SARS‐CoV‐2 positive farms is a risk factor. As of 29 January 2021, SARS‐CoV‐2 virus has been reported in 400 mink farms in eight countries in the European Union. In most cases, the likely introduction of SARS‐CoV‐2 infection into farms was infected humans. Human health can be at risk by mink‐related variant viruses, which can establish circulation in the community, but so far these have not shown to be more transmissible or causing more severe impact compared with other circulating SARS‐CoV‐2. Concerning animal health risk posed by SARS‐CoV‐2 infection the animal species that may be included in monitoring plans are American mink, ferrets, cats, raccoon dogs, white‐tailed deer and Rhinolophidae bats. All mink farms should be considered at risk of infection; therefore, the monitoring objective should be early detection. This includes passive monitoring (in place in the whole territory of all countries where animals susceptible to SARS‐CoV‐2 are bred) but also active monitoring by regular testing. First, frequent testing of farm personnel and all people in contact with the animals is recommended. Furthermore randomly selected animals (dead or sick animals should be included) should be tested using reverse transcriptase‐polymerase chain reaction (RT‐PCR), ideally at weekly intervals (i.e. design prevalence approximately 5% in each epidemiological unit, to be assessed case by case). Suspected animals (dead or with clinical signs and a minimum five animals) should be tested for confirmation of SARS‐CoV‐2 infection. Positive samples from each farm should be sequenced to monitor virus evolution and results publicly shared. John Wiley and Sons Inc. 2021-03-03 /pmc/articles/PMC7926496/ /pubmed/33717355 http://dx.doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2021.6459 Text en © 2021 European Food Safety Authority and European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. This is an open access article under the terms of the http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/ License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited and no modifications or adaptations are made.
spellingShingle Scientific Report
Boklund, Anette
Gortázar, Christian
Pasquali, Paolo
Roberts, Helen
Nielsen, Søren Saxmose
Stahl, Karl
Stegeman, Arjan
Baldinelli, Francesca
Broglia, Alessandro
Van Der Stede, Yves
Adlhoch, Cornelia
Alm, Erik
Melidou, Angeliki
Mirinaviciute, Grazina
Monitoring of SARS‐CoV‐2 infection in mustelids
title Monitoring of SARS‐CoV‐2 infection in mustelids
title_full Monitoring of SARS‐CoV‐2 infection in mustelids
title_fullStr Monitoring of SARS‐CoV‐2 infection in mustelids
title_full_unstemmed Monitoring of SARS‐CoV‐2 infection in mustelids
title_short Monitoring of SARS‐CoV‐2 infection in mustelids
title_sort monitoring of sars‐cov‐2 infection in mustelids
topic Scientific Report
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7926496/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33717355
http://dx.doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2021.6459
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