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Information exchange in laboratory markets: competition, transfer costs, and the emergence of reputation
Public reputation mechanisms are an effective means to limit opportunistic behavior in markets suffering from moral hazard problems. While previous research was mostly concerned with the influence of exogenous feedback mechanisms, this study considers the endogenous emergence of reputation through d...
Autores principales: | Hoffmann, Roman, Kittel, Bernhard, Larsen, Mattias |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Springer US
2020
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7954753/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33786011 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-020-09652-0 |
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