Lessons learned from reviewing a hospital’s disaster response to the hydrofluoric acid leak in Gumi city in 2012

BACKGROUND: This study analyzed the characteristics of hydrogen fluoride-exposed patients (HFEPs) treated in the emergency department (ED) of a local university hospital, and reviewed the hospital’s disaster response according to space, staff, supplies, and systems (4Ss). METHODS: This retrospective observational chart review and descriptive study included 199 HFEPs among 2588 total ED patients who visited a local university emergency medical center for treatment between September 27, 2012 and October 20, 2012, following a hydrofluoric acid leak at the Hube Globe factory in Gumi City, Republic of Korea. Descriptive results concerning the 4Ss were obtained by interviewing ED specialist staff physicians on duty during the study period. In accordance with American Burn Association criteria, patients requiring burn center referral were assigned to the major burn group (MBG) as severe condition. RESULTS: During the acute phase (within 8 h after leak initiation), there were 43 patients in the ED, which was staffed with 3 doctors and 3 nurses, without 4S resources. Of these 43 patients, there were 8 HFEPs (100%) in the MBG and 0 in the non-MBG (NMBG). During the subacute phase (24 h after the acute phase), there were 262 patients in the ED including 167 HFEPs, of whom 45 (26.95%) were in the MBG and 122 (73.05%) were in the NMBG. The ED was then staffed with 6 doctors (3 on day shift and 3 on night shift) and 10 nurses (3 on day shift, 4 on evening shift, and 3 on night shift), and no 4S resources were available. Throughout the study period, no 4Ss were available. First, there was no expansion of ED space or secured disaster reserve beds. Second, there was no increase in manpower with duty time adjustments or duty relocation for ED working personnel. Third, there was no logistics reinforcement (e.g., antidote or personal protective equipment). Fourth, there were no disaster-related measures for the administration department, decontamination zone setup, safety diagnostic testing, or designated disaster triage implementation. CONCLUSIONS: The hospital’s disaster response was insufficient for all aspects of the 4Ss. Detailed guidance concerning a hospital disaster management plan is required.