An optimal put option contract for a reverse supply chain: case of remanufacturing capacity uncertainty

Reverse supply chain (RSC) management can be implemented to ameliorate environmental and economic goals simultaneously. In 2020, the devastating influences generated by the COVID-19 global pandemic had established high uncertainty in the manufacturers' capacity, which can hinder the fulfillment of such goals. To address such a problem, in this research, we analyze a two-echelon RSC, including a re-manufacturer who, despite facing the remanufacturing capacity uncertainty, remanufactures eligible obsolete products, then re-enters the marketplace, and a collector who accumulates eligible obsolete products from consumers. We survey centralized and decentralized decisions, and also a condition where the collector, as a Stackelberg game leader, offers a put option contract as a risk-sharing approach and decides on both option and exercise prices; in return, the re-manufacturer determines the order quantity. Contrary to previous studies in which the value of option contracts has been analyzed under demand disruptions, this paper aims to address the performance of a put option contract to mitigate the remanufacturing capacity uncertainty in an RSC. Our results demonstrate that by offering the put option contract and determining the option price as nearly low as the marginal refund cost, not only can the collector motivate the re-manufacturer to augment its order quantity but both parties also attain a win–win profit-sharing outcome. Besides, the customized put option contract can achieve Pareto-improving channel coordination in the condition of remanufacturing capacity uncertainty.