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Developing a Dynamic Supervision Mechanism to Improve Construction Safety Investment Supervision Efficiency in China: Theoretical Simulation of Evolutionary Game Process
The construction industry suffers from poor safety performance caused by the joint effect of insufficient safety investment by contractors and inefficient safety supervision by the government because of the information gap between the two sides. The present study aims to put forward a new pathway to...
Autores principales: | Gong, Shitao, Gao, Xin, Li, Zhou, Chen, Linyan |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
MDPI
2021
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8036454/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33808439 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph18073594 |
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