Cargando…

Singularity and consciousness: A neuropsychological contribution

In common sense experience based on introspection, consciousness is singular. There is only one ‘me’ and that is the one that is conscious. This means that ‘singularity’ is a defining aspect of ‘consciousness’. However, the three main theories of consciousness, Integrated Information, Global Workspa...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: de Haan, Edward H. F., Scholte, Huibert Steven, Pinto, Yair, Foschi, Nicoletta, Polonara, Gabriele, Fabri, Mara
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: John Wiley and Sons Inc. 2021
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8048575/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33522716
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jnp.12234
_version_ 1783679251693699072
author de Haan, Edward H. F.
Scholte, Huibert Steven
Pinto, Yair
Foschi, Nicoletta
Polonara, Gabriele
Fabri, Mara
author_facet de Haan, Edward H. F.
Scholte, Huibert Steven
Pinto, Yair
Foschi, Nicoletta
Polonara, Gabriele
Fabri, Mara
author_sort de Haan, Edward H. F.
collection PubMed
description In common sense experience based on introspection, consciousness is singular. There is only one ‘me’ and that is the one that is conscious. This means that ‘singularity’ is a defining aspect of ‘consciousness’. However, the three main theories of consciousness, Integrated Information, Global Workspace and Recurrent Processing theory, are generally not very clear on this issue. These theories have traditionally relied heavily on neuropsychological observations and have interpreted various disorders, such as anosognosia, neglect and split‐brain as impairments in conscious awareness without any reference to ‘the singularity’. In this review, we will re‐examine the theoretical implications of these impairments in conscious awareness and propose a new way how to conceptualize consciousness of singularity. We will argue that the subjective feeling of singularity can coexist with several disunified conscious experiences. Singularity awareness may only come into existence due to environmental response constraints. That is, perceptual, language, memory, attentional and motor processes may largely proceed unintegrated in parallel, whereas a sense of unity only arises when organisms need to respond coherently constrained by the affordances of the environment. Next, we examine from this perspective psychiatric disorders and psycho‐active drugs. Finally, we present a first attempt to test this hypothesis with a resting state imaging experiment in a split‐brain patient. The results suggest that there is substantial coherence of activation across the two hemispheres. These data show that a complete lesioning of the corpus callosum does not, in general, alter the resting state networks of the brain. Thus, we propose that we have separate systems in the brain that generate distributed conscious. The sense of singularity, the experience of a ‘Me‐ness’, emerges in the interaction between the world and response‐planning systems, and this leads to coherent activation in the different functional networks across the cortex.
format Online
Article
Text
id pubmed-8048575
institution National Center for Biotechnology Information
language English
publishDate 2021
publisher John Wiley and Sons Inc.
record_format MEDLINE/PubMed
spelling pubmed-80485752021-04-19 Singularity and consciousness: A neuropsychological contribution de Haan, Edward H. F. Scholte, Huibert Steven Pinto, Yair Foschi, Nicoletta Polonara, Gabriele Fabri, Mara J Neuropsychol Editor Invited Paper In common sense experience based on introspection, consciousness is singular. There is only one ‘me’ and that is the one that is conscious. This means that ‘singularity’ is a defining aspect of ‘consciousness’. However, the three main theories of consciousness, Integrated Information, Global Workspace and Recurrent Processing theory, are generally not very clear on this issue. These theories have traditionally relied heavily on neuropsychological observations and have interpreted various disorders, such as anosognosia, neglect and split‐brain as impairments in conscious awareness without any reference to ‘the singularity’. In this review, we will re‐examine the theoretical implications of these impairments in conscious awareness and propose a new way how to conceptualize consciousness of singularity. We will argue that the subjective feeling of singularity can coexist with several disunified conscious experiences. Singularity awareness may only come into existence due to environmental response constraints. That is, perceptual, language, memory, attentional and motor processes may largely proceed unintegrated in parallel, whereas a sense of unity only arises when organisms need to respond coherently constrained by the affordances of the environment. Next, we examine from this perspective psychiatric disorders and psycho‐active drugs. Finally, we present a first attempt to test this hypothesis with a resting state imaging experiment in a split‐brain patient. The results suggest that there is substantial coherence of activation across the two hemispheres. These data show that a complete lesioning of the corpus callosum does not, in general, alter the resting state networks of the brain. Thus, we propose that we have separate systems in the brain that generate distributed conscious. The sense of singularity, the experience of a ‘Me‐ness’, emerges in the interaction between the world and response‐planning systems, and this leads to coherent activation in the different functional networks across the cortex. John Wiley and Sons Inc. 2021-02-01 2021-03 /pmc/articles/PMC8048575/ /pubmed/33522716 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jnp.12234 Text en © 2021 The Authors. Journal of Neuropsychology published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British Psychological Society https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/This is an open access article under the terms of the http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non‐commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.
spellingShingle Editor Invited Paper
de Haan, Edward H. F.
Scholte, Huibert Steven
Pinto, Yair
Foschi, Nicoletta
Polonara, Gabriele
Fabri, Mara
Singularity and consciousness: A neuropsychological contribution
title Singularity and consciousness: A neuropsychological contribution
title_full Singularity and consciousness: A neuropsychological contribution
title_fullStr Singularity and consciousness: A neuropsychological contribution
title_full_unstemmed Singularity and consciousness: A neuropsychological contribution
title_short Singularity and consciousness: A neuropsychological contribution
title_sort singularity and consciousness: a neuropsychological contribution
topic Editor Invited Paper
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8048575/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33522716
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jnp.12234
work_keys_str_mv AT dehaanedwardhf singularityandconsciousnessaneuropsychologicalcontribution
AT scholtehuibertsteven singularityandconsciousnessaneuropsychologicalcontribution
AT pintoyair singularityandconsciousnessaneuropsychologicalcontribution
AT foschinicoletta singularityandconsciousnessaneuropsychologicalcontribution
AT polonaragabriele singularityandconsciousnessaneuropsychologicalcontribution
AT fabrimara singularityandconsciousnessaneuropsychologicalcontribution