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Individually optimal choices can be collectively disastrous in COVID-19 disease control
BACKGROUND: The word ‘pandemic’ conjures dystopian images of bodies stacked in the streets and societies on the brink of collapse. Despite this frightening picture, denialism and noncompliance with public health measures are common in the historical record, for example during the 1918 Influenza pand...
Autores principales: | , , , , , , , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
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BioMed Central
2021
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8085805/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33931055 http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s12889-021-10829-2 |
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author | Stoddard, Madison Van Egeren, Debra Johnson, Kaitlyn E. Rao, Smriti Furgeson, Josh White, Douglas E. Nolan, Ryan P. Hochberg, Natasha Chakravarty, Arijit |
author_facet | Stoddard, Madison Van Egeren, Debra Johnson, Kaitlyn E. Rao, Smriti Furgeson, Josh White, Douglas E. Nolan, Ryan P. Hochberg, Natasha Chakravarty, Arijit |
author_sort | Stoddard, Madison |
collection | PubMed |
description | BACKGROUND: The word ‘pandemic’ conjures dystopian images of bodies stacked in the streets and societies on the brink of collapse. Despite this frightening picture, denialism and noncompliance with public health measures are common in the historical record, for example during the 1918 Influenza pandemic or the 2015 Ebola epidemic. The unique characteristics of SARS-CoV-2—its high basic reproduction number (R(0)), time-limited natural immunity and considerable potential for asymptomatic spread—exacerbate the public health repercussions of noncompliance with interventions (such as vaccines and masks) to limit disease transmission. Our work explores the rationality and impact of noncompliance with measures aimed at limiting the spread of SARS-CoV-2. METHODS: In this work, we used game theory to explore when noncompliance confers a perceived benefit to individuals. We then used epidemiological modeling to predict the impact of noncompliance on control of SARS-CoV-2, demonstrating that the presence of a noncompliant subpopulation prevents suppression of disease spread. RESULTS: Our modeling demonstrates that noncompliance is a Nash equilibrium under a broad set of conditions and that the existence of a noncompliant population can result in extensive endemic disease in the long-term after a return to pre-pandemic social and economic activity. Endemic disease poses a threat for both compliant and noncompliant individuals; all community members are protected if complete suppression is achieved, which is only possible with a high degree of compliance. For interventions that are highly effective at preventing disease spread, however, the consequences of noncompliance are borne disproportionately by noncompliant individuals. CONCLUSIONS: In sum, our work demonstrates the limits of free-market approaches to compliance with disease control measures during a pandemic. The act of noncompliance with disease intervention measures creates a negative externality, rendering suppression of SARS-CoV-2 spread ineffective. Our work underscores the importance of developing effective strategies for prophylaxis through public health measures aimed at complete suppression and the need to focus on compliance at a population level. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1186/s12889-021-10829-2. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-8085805 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2021 |
publisher | BioMed Central |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-80858052021-04-30 Individually optimal choices can be collectively disastrous in COVID-19 disease control Stoddard, Madison Van Egeren, Debra Johnson, Kaitlyn E. Rao, Smriti Furgeson, Josh White, Douglas E. Nolan, Ryan P. Hochberg, Natasha Chakravarty, Arijit BMC Public Health Research BACKGROUND: The word ‘pandemic’ conjures dystopian images of bodies stacked in the streets and societies on the brink of collapse. Despite this frightening picture, denialism and noncompliance with public health measures are common in the historical record, for example during the 1918 Influenza pandemic or the 2015 Ebola epidemic. The unique characteristics of SARS-CoV-2—its high basic reproduction number (R(0)), time-limited natural immunity and considerable potential for asymptomatic spread—exacerbate the public health repercussions of noncompliance with interventions (such as vaccines and masks) to limit disease transmission. Our work explores the rationality and impact of noncompliance with measures aimed at limiting the spread of SARS-CoV-2. METHODS: In this work, we used game theory to explore when noncompliance confers a perceived benefit to individuals. We then used epidemiological modeling to predict the impact of noncompliance on control of SARS-CoV-2, demonstrating that the presence of a noncompliant subpopulation prevents suppression of disease spread. RESULTS: Our modeling demonstrates that noncompliance is a Nash equilibrium under a broad set of conditions and that the existence of a noncompliant population can result in extensive endemic disease in the long-term after a return to pre-pandemic social and economic activity. Endemic disease poses a threat for both compliant and noncompliant individuals; all community members are protected if complete suppression is achieved, which is only possible with a high degree of compliance. For interventions that are highly effective at preventing disease spread, however, the consequences of noncompliance are borne disproportionately by noncompliant individuals. CONCLUSIONS: In sum, our work demonstrates the limits of free-market approaches to compliance with disease control measures during a pandemic. The act of noncompliance with disease intervention measures creates a negative externality, rendering suppression of SARS-CoV-2 spread ineffective. Our work underscores the importance of developing effective strategies for prophylaxis through public health measures aimed at complete suppression and the need to focus on compliance at a population level. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1186/s12889-021-10829-2. BioMed Central 2021-04-30 /pmc/articles/PMC8085805/ /pubmed/33931055 http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s12889-021-10829-2 Text en © The Author(s) 2021 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Open AccessThis article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) . The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver (http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) ) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated in a credit line to the data. |
spellingShingle | Research Stoddard, Madison Van Egeren, Debra Johnson, Kaitlyn E. Rao, Smriti Furgeson, Josh White, Douglas E. Nolan, Ryan P. Hochberg, Natasha Chakravarty, Arijit Individually optimal choices can be collectively disastrous in COVID-19 disease control |
title | Individually optimal choices can be collectively disastrous in COVID-19 disease control |
title_full | Individually optimal choices can be collectively disastrous in COVID-19 disease control |
title_fullStr | Individually optimal choices can be collectively disastrous in COVID-19 disease control |
title_full_unstemmed | Individually optimal choices can be collectively disastrous in COVID-19 disease control |
title_short | Individually optimal choices can be collectively disastrous in COVID-19 disease control |
title_sort | individually optimal choices can be collectively disastrous in covid-19 disease control |
topic | Research |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8085805/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33931055 http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s12889-021-10829-2 |
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