Location-Price Equilibria when Traditional Retailers Compete Against an Online Retailer

We consider a location-then-price game where two traditional retailers compete with a location-irrelevant online retailer. We characterize the existing equilibria, and we show that in any possible equilibrium there is direct competition between the traditional retailers. Furthermore, the traditional...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Colombo, Stefano, Hou, Zemin
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Springer US 2021
Materias:
Article
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8093135/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33967386
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11151-021-09814-1

Internet

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8093135/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33967386
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11151-021-09814-1

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