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Coronavirus disease 2019 outbreak in Beijing’s Xinfadi Market, China: a modeling study to inform future resurgence response
BACKGROUND: A local coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) case confirmed on June 11, 2020 triggered an outbreak in Beijing, China after 56 consecutive days without a newly confirmed case. Non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) were used to contain the source in Xinfadi (XFD) market. To rapidly contro...
Autores principales: | , , , , , , , , , , , , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
BioMed Central
2021
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8103671/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33962683 http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s40249-021-00843-2 |
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author | Wang, Xiao-Li Lin, Xin Yang, Peng Wu, Zun-You Li, Gang McGoogan, Jennifer M. Jiao, Zeng-Tao He, Xin-Jun Li, Si-Qi Shi, Hong-Hao Wang, Jing-Yuan Lai, Sheng-Jie Huang, Chun Wang, Quan-Yi |
author_facet | Wang, Xiao-Li Lin, Xin Yang, Peng Wu, Zun-You Li, Gang McGoogan, Jennifer M. Jiao, Zeng-Tao He, Xin-Jun Li, Si-Qi Shi, Hong-Hao Wang, Jing-Yuan Lai, Sheng-Jie Huang, Chun Wang, Quan-Yi |
author_sort | Wang, Xiao-Li |
collection | PubMed |
description | BACKGROUND: A local coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) case confirmed on June 11, 2020 triggered an outbreak in Beijing, China after 56 consecutive days without a newly confirmed case. Non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) were used to contain the source in Xinfadi (XFD) market. To rapidly control the outbreak, both traditional and newly introduced NPIs including large-scale management of high-risk populations and expanded severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) PCR-based screening in the general population were conducted in Beijing. We aimed to assess the effectiveness of the response to the COVID-19 outbreak in Beijing’s XFD market and inform future response efforts of resurgence across regions. METHODS: A modified susceptible–exposed–infectious–recovered (SEIR) model was developed and applied to evaluate a range of different scenarios from the public health perspective. Two outcomes were measured: magnitude of transmission (i.e., number of cases in the outbreak) and endpoint of transmission (i.e., date of containment). The outcomes of scenario evaluations were presented relative to the reality case (i.e., 368 cases in 34 days) with 95% Confidence Interval (CI). RESULTS: Our results indicated that a 3 to 14 day delay in the identification of XFD as the infection source and initiation of NPIs would have caused a 3 to 28-fold increase in total case number (31–77 day delay in containment). A failure to implement the quarantine scheme employed in the XFD outbreak for defined key population would have caused a fivefold greater number of cases (73 day delay in containment). Similarly, failure to implement the quarantine plan executed in the XFD outbreak for close contacts would have caused twofold greater transmission (44 day delay in containment). Finally, failure to implement expanded nucleic acid screening in the general population would have yielded 1.6-fold greater transmission and a 32 day delay to containment. CONCLUSIONS: This study informs new evidence that in form the selection of NPI to use as countermeasures in response to a COVID-19 outbreak and optimal timing of their implementation. The evidence provided by this study should inform responses to future outbreaks of COVID-19 and future infectious disease outbreak preparedness efforts in China and elsewhere. GRAPHICAL ABSTRACT: [Image: see text] SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1186/s40249-021-00843-2. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-8103671 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2021 |
publisher | BioMed Central |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-81036712021-05-10 Coronavirus disease 2019 outbreak in Beijing’s Xinfadi Market, China: a modeling study to inform future resurgence response Wang, Xiao-Li Lin, Xin Yang, Peng Wu, Zun-You Li, Gang McGoogan, Jennifer M. Jiao, Zeng-Tao He, Xin-Jun Li, Si-Qi Shi, Hong-Hao Wang, Jing-Yuan Lai, Sheng-Jie Huang, Chun Wang, Quan-Yi Infect Dis Poverty Short Report BACKGROUND: A local coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) case confirmed on June 11, 2020 triggered an outbreak in Beijing, China after 56 consecutive days without a newly confirmed case. Non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) were used to contain the source in Xinfadi (XFD) market. To rapidly control the outbreak, both traditional and newly introduced NPIs including large-scale management of high-risk populations and expanded severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) PCR-based screening in the general population were conducted in Beijing. We aimed to assess the effectiveness of the response to the COVID-19 outbreak in Beijing’s XFD market and inform future response efforts of resurgence across regions. METHODS: A modified susceptible–exposed–infectious–recovered (SEIR) model was developed and applied to evaluate a range of different scenarios from the public health perspective. Two outcomes were measured: magnitude of transmission (i.e., number of cases in the outbreak) and endpoint of transmission (i.e., date of containment). The outcomes of scenario evaluations were presented relative to the reality case (i.e., 368 cases in 34 days) with 95% Confidence Interval (CI). RESULTS: Our results indicated that a 3 to 14 day delay in the identification of XFD as the infection source and initiation of NPIs would have caused a 3 to 28-fold increase in total case number (31–77 day delay in containment). A failure to implement the quarantine scheme employed in the XFD outbreak for defined key population would have caused a fivefold greater number of cases (73 day delay in containment). Similarly, failure to implement the quarantine plan executed in the XFD outbreak for close contacts would have caused twofold greater transmission (44 day delay in containment). Finally, failure to implement expanded nucleic acid screening in the general population would have yielded 1.6-fold greater transmission and a 32 day delay to containment. CONCLUSIONS: This study informs new evidence that in form the selection of NPI to use as countermeasures in response to a COVID-19 outbreak and optimal timing of their implementation. The evidence provided by this study should inform responses to future outbreaks of COVID-19 and future infectious disease outbreak preparedness efforts in China and elsewhere. GRAPHICAL ABSTRACT: [Image: see text] SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1186/s40249-021-00843-2. BioMed Central 2021-05-07 /pmc/articles/PMC8103671/ /pubmed/33962683 http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s40249-021-00843-2 Text en © The Author(s) 2021 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Open AccessThis article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) . The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver (http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) ) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated in a credit line to the data. |
spellingShingle | Short Report Wang, Xiao-Li Lin, Xin Yang, Peng Wu, Zun-You Li, Gang McGoogan, Jennifer M. Jiao, Zeng-Tao He, Xin-Jun Li, Si-Qi Shi, Hong-Hao Wang, Jing-Yuan Lai, Sheng-Jie Huang, Chun Wang, Quan-Yi Coronavirus disease 2019 outbreak in Beijing’s Xinfadi Market, China: a modeling study to inform future resurgence response |
title | Coronavirus disease 2019 outbreak in Beijing’s Xinfadi Market, China: a modeling study to inform future resurgence response |
title_full | Coronavirus disease 2019 outbreak in Beijing’s Xinfadi Market, China: a modeling study to inform future resurgence response |
title_fullStr | Coronavirus disease 2019 outbreak in Beijing’s Xinfadi Market, China: a modeling study to inform future resurgence response |
title_full_unstemmed | Coronavirus disease 2019 outbreak in Beijing’s Xinfadi Market, China: a modeling study to inform future resurgence response |
title_short | Coronavirus disease 2019 outbreak in Beijing’s Xinfadi Market, China: a modeling study to inform future resurgence response |
title_sort | coronavirus disease 2019 outbreak in beijing’s xinfadi market, china: a modeling study to inform future resurgence response |
topic | Short Report |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8103671/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33962683 http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s40249-021-00843-2 |
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