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Two-dimensional adaptive dynamics of evolutionary public goods games: finite-size effects on fixation probability and branching time

Public goods games (PGGs) describe situations in which individuals contribute to a good at a private cost, but others can free-ride by receiving a share of the public benefit at no cost. The game occurs within local neighbourhoods, which are subsets of the whole population. Free-riding and maximal p...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Johnson, Brian, Altrock, Philipp M., Kimmel, Gregory J.
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: The Royal Society 2021
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8150049/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34084549
http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.210182
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author Johnson, Brian
Altrock, Philipp M.
Kimmel, Gregory J.
author_facet Johnson, Brian
Altrock, Philipp M.
Kimmel, Gregory J.
author_sort Johnson, Brian
collection PubMed
description Public goods games (PGGs) describe situations in which individuals contribute to a good at a private cost, but others can free-ride by receiving a share of the public benefit at no cost. The game occurs within local neighbourhoods, which are subsets of the whole population. Free-riding and maximal production are two extremes of a continuous spectrum of traits. We study the adaptive dynamics of production and neighbourhood size. We allow the public good production and the neighbourhood size to coevolve and observe evolutionary branching. We explain how an initially monomorphic population undergoes evolutionary branching in two dimensions to become a dimorphic population characterized by extremes of the spectrum of trait values. We find that population size plays a crucial role in determining the final state of the population. Small populations may not branch or may be subject to extinction of a subpopulation after branching. In small populations, stochastic effects become important and we calculate the probability of subpopulation extinction. Our work elucidates the evolutionary origins of heterogeneity in local PGGs among individuals of two traits (production and neighbourhood size), and the effects of stochasticity in two-dimensional trait space, where novel effects emerge.
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spelling pubmed-81500492021-06-02 Two-dimensional adaptive dynamics of evolutionary public goods games: finite-size effects on fixation probability and branching time Johnson, Brian Altrock, Philipp M. Kimmel, Gregory J. R Soc Open Sci Mathematics Public goods games (PGGs) describe situations in which individuals contribute to a good at a private cost, but others can free-ride by receiving a share of the public benefit at no cost. The game occurs within local neighbourhoods, which are subsets of the whole population. Free-riding and maximal production are two extremes of a continuous spectrum of traits. We study the adaptive dynamics of production and neighbourhood size. We allow the public good production and the neighbourhood size to coevolve and observe evolutionary branching. We explain how an initially monomorphic population undergoes evolutionary branching in two dimensions to become a dimorphic population characterized by extremes of the spectrum of trait values. We find that population size plays a crucial role in determining the final state of the population. Small populations may not branch or may be subject to extinction of a subpopulation after branching. In small populations, stochastic effects become important and we calculate the probability of subpopulation extinction. Our work elucidates the evolutionary origins of heterogeneity in local PGGs among individuals of two traits (production and neighbourhood size), and the effects of stochasticity in two-dimensional trait space, where novel effects emerge. The Royal Society 2021-05-26 /pmc/articles/PMC8150049/ /pubmed/34084549 http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.210182 Text en © 2021 The Authors. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) , which permits unrestricted use, provided the original author and source are credited.
spellingShingle Mathematics
Johnson, Brian
Altrock, Philipp M.
Kimmel, Gregory J.
Two-dimensional adaptive dynamics of evolutionary public goods games: finite-size effects on fixation probability and branching time
title Two-dimensional adaptive dynamics of evolutionary public goods games: finite-size effects on fixation probability and branching time
title_full Two-dimensional adaptive dynamics of evolutionary public goods games: finite-size effects on fixation probability and branching time
title_fullStr Two-dimensional adaptive dynamics of evolutionary public goods games: finite-size effects on fixation probability and branching time
title_full_unstemmed Two-dimensional adaptive dynamics of evolutionary public goods games: finite-size effects on fixation probability and branching time
title_short Two-dimensional adaptive dynamics of evolutionary public goods games: finite-size effects on fixation probability and branching time
title_sort two-dimensional adaptive dynamics of evolutionary public goods games: finite-size effects on fixation probability and branching time
topic Mathematics
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8150049/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34084549
http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.210182
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