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Two-dimensional adaptive dynamics of evolutionary public goods games: finite-size effects on fixation probability and branching time
Public goods games (PGGs) describe situations in which individuals contribute to a good at a private cost, but others can free-ride by receiving a share of the public benefit at no cost. The game occurs within local neighbourhoods, which are subsets of the whole population. Free-riding and maximal p...
Autores principales: | , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
The Royal Society
2021
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8150049/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34084549 http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.210182 |
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author | Johnson, Brian Altrock, Philipp M. Kimmel, Gregory J. |
author_facet | Johnson, Brian Altrock, Philipp M. Kimmel, Gregory J. |
author_sort | Johnson, Brian |
collection | PubMed |
description | Public goods games (PGGs) describe situations in which individuals contribute to a good at a private cost, but others can free-ride by receiving a share of the public benefit at no cost. The game occurs within local neighbourhoods, which are subsets of the whole population. Free-riding and maximal production are two extremes of a continuous spectrum of traits. We study the adaptive dynamics of production and neighbourhood size. We allow the public good production and the neighbourhood size to coevolve and observe evolutionary branching. We explain how an initially monomorphic population undergoes evolutionary branching in two dimensions to become a dimorphic population characterized by extremes of the spectrum of trait values. We find that population size plays a crucial role in determining the final state of the population. Small populations may not branch or may be subject to extinction of a subpopulation after branching. In small populations, stochastic effects become important and we calculate the probability of subpopulation extinction. Our work elucidates the evolutionary origins of heterogeneity in local PGGs among individuals of two traits (production and neighbourhood size), and the effects of stochasticity in two-dimensional trait space, where novel effects emerge. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-8150049 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2021 |
publisher | The Royal Society |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-81500492021-06-02 Two-dimensional adaptive dynamics of evolutionary public goods games: finite-size effects on fixation probability and branching time Johnson, Brian Altrock, Philipp M. Kimmel, Gregory J. R Soc Open Sci Mathematics Public goods games (PGGs) describe situations in which individuals contribute to a good at a private cost, but others can free-ride by receiving a share of the public benefit at no cost. The game occurs within local neighbourhoods, which are subsets of the whole population. Free-riding and maximal production are two extremes of a continuous spectrum of traits. We study the adaptive dynamics of production and neighbourhood size. We allow the public good production and the neighbourhood size to coevolve and observe evolutionary branching. We explain how an initially monomorphic population undergoes evolutionary branching in two dimensions to become a dimorphic population characterized by extremes of the spectrum of trait values. We find that population size plays a crucial role in determining the final state of the population. Small populations may not branch or may be subject to extinction of a subpopulation after branching. In small populations, stochastic effects become important and we calculate the probability of subpopulation extinction. Our work elucidates the evolutionary origins of heterogeneity in local PGGs among individuals of two traits (production and neighbourhood size), and the effects of stochasticity in two-dimensional trait space, where novel effects emerge. The Royal Society 2021-05-26 /pmc/articles/PMC8150049/ /pubmed/34084549 http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.210182 Text en © 2021 The Authors. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) , which permits unrestricted use, provided the original author and source are credited. |
spellingShingle | Mathematics Johnson, Brian Altrock, Philipp M. Kimmel, Gregory J. Two-dimensional adaptive dynamics of evolutionary public goods games: finite-size effects on fixation probability and branching time |
title | Two-dimensional adaptive dynamics of evolutionary public goods games: finite-size effects on fixation probability and branching time |
title_full | Two-dimensional adaptive dynamics of evolutionary public goods games: finite-size effects on fixation probability and branching time |
title_fullStr | Two-dimensional adaptive dynamics of evolutionary public goods games: finite-size effects on fixation probability and branching time |
title_full_unstemmed | Two-dimensional adaptive dynamics of evolutionary public goods games: finite-size effects on fixation probability and branching time |
title_short | Two-dimensional adaptive dynamics of evolutionary public goods games: finite-size effects on fixation probability and branching time |
title_sort | two-dimensional adaptive dynamics of evolutionary public goods games: finite-size effects on fixation probability and branching time |
topic | Mathematics |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8150049/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34084549 http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.210182 |
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