Cargando…
Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence
The normative force of evidence can seem puzzling. It seems that having conclusive evidence for a proposition does not, by itself, make it true that one ought to believe the proposition. But spelling out the condition that evidence must meet in order to provide us with genuine normative reasons for...
Autor principal: | Schmidt, Sebastian |
---|---|
Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Springer Netherlands
2021
|
Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8202045/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34149123 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-021-00430-9 |
Ejemplares similares
-
The Sources of Political Normativity: the Case for Instrumental and Epistemic Normativity in Political Realism
por: Burelli, Carlo, et al.
Publicado: (2021) -
Academia’s Big Five: a normative taxonomy for the epistemic responsibilities of universities
por: Peels, Rik, et al.
Publicado: (2020) -
Experimental evidence of subtle victim blame in the absence of explicit blame
por: Hafer, Carolyn L., et al.
Publicado: (2019) -
Epistemic anxiety and epistemic risk
por: Newton, Lilith
Publicado: (2022) -
Epistemic Health, Epistemic Immunity and Epistemic Inoculation
por: Piovarchy, Adam, et al.
Publicado: (2023)