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Evolution of deterrence with costly reputation information
Deterrence, a defender’s avoidance of a challenger’s attack based on the threat of retaliation, is a basic ingredient of social cooperation in several animal species and is ubiquitous in human societies. Deterrence theory has recognized that deterrence can only be based on credible threats, but reta...
Autores principales: | Berger, Ulrich, De Silva, Hannelore |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Public Library of Science
2021
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8205128/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34129645 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0253344 |
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